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FOREWORD
The following report is an analysis of some of the significant
factors considered by industrialand government aerospace executives
in their long-range planning and decision-making activities.
Itis one of a series of studies on management concepts, functions
and processes, and is based on: 1) an analysis of selected books, docu-
ments and reports; 2) discussions with responsible and knowledgeable
individuals in the federal government, in research institutesand in
private industry; and 3) prior studies conducted by the author while
serving in staff and management capacities in the aerospace industry. *
The report evolved in several phases. During the initial stages
a preliminary survey of the planning process within a selected group of
aerospace companies, government agencies and not-for-profit institutes
was conducted. For each of the organizations surveyed, data was
obtained through interviews and correspondence on the following topics:
* While much of the data for this report were obtained from personal
interviews and a literature search, the basic concept and the research
approach employed evolved from the following studies in which the writer
participated as author and co-author respectively:
The National Space Program: Some Considerations for Aerospace
Management, The Systems Development Corporation, Santa Monica,
California, September 1963, and
Hilltop 1970: An Analysis of the Key Factors Influencing National Policy
and the Future of the MRrtin Company in the 1960Ws, The Martin Company,
Denver, Colorado, 1957.
1)general characteristics of the coml_my, agencyor insUtute; 2) the
evolution of long-range planning within the specific organization surveyed;
3) management's role in decision-making and planning; and 4) the
orgsatzation's planning process, including the basic assumptions, the
factors considered and the data base. To supplement the organizational
survey a comprehensive literature search was conducted and a detailed
bibliography prepared.
The initial survey indicated that while each company, agency or
institute that was interviewed followed certain common principles, the
structure and tttilizafion of planning within each organizaUon, as well as
the relevant assumptions, varied from company to company and problem
to problem. This led to the subsequent conclusion that there was no
universally acceptable planning format suitable for all___companies and all
situations. In addition, the literature search revealed that a number of
worthwhile books and articles had been prepared on the basic principles
of planning, including detailed ease histories of the techniques employed
by specific companies.* Consequently, it was not necessary to prepare
another "cookbook" on long-range planning--including a collection of
specific company "recipes." Such an effort would only duplicate the
work of other individuals and organizations.
* See Bibliography; 12, 35, 36.
Therefore, on the basis d the initial research, coupled with a
desire to produce a unique and informative document, it was decided for
the final report to prepare an analysis of the key economic, technical and
sociopolitical factors considered by aerospace managers in their
long-range planning and decision-making functions, stressing not only
the significance of these factors but more importantly their interrala-
Uonships and utility.
With this kind of emphasis attention would be focused on the
interdisciplin_ry or "systems" aspects of the space-age planning
process, and some insight into the challenges and problems facing
aerospace executives would thus be provided.
The study was supported by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration under General Grant No. NsG-727. Much of the data
employed in the study has been provided by numerous individuals and
or_nlzations to which the author is deeply indebted. However, the
opinions expressed and the conclusions reached are the authorls and do
not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the l_rogram of
Policy Studies, The George Washington University, or the sponsoring
agency.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the launching of the first Sputnik in October, 1957, the
space program has become one of the major generators of economic and
technological growth and development in the United States, and has had
a significant effect on our international prestige, as well as on the poli-
tical and social character of the nation. Evidence of this can be found
in the rapid growth of technologically-based industries; in the economic
and social impact of new space activities on selected cities and towns;
in the growing status and power of the engineer and scientist both in
industry and in the federal government; and the geometric increase
in public and private expenditures for space-oriented R & D. Further-
more, the space effort has become a major issue in political campaigns
and activities, and its scope and magnitude are influencing man's view
of himself in a rapidly shrinking world.
This dynamic increase in space activities has brought with it new
and challenging management problems which have been met in part by the
creation of special organizations such as Bellcomm, The Aerospace Cor-
poration, Comsat and NASA, and has accelerated the development of
new management !_chniquessueh as_PERT/Cost, program budgeting,
systems engineering, and long-range planning. Partially as a consequence
of these analytical, organizational and procedural innovations a managerial
and technological revolution has taken place in those private organizations
and federal agencies directly involved in the space program. This revolution
2has created both problems and opportunities for executives and managers
who must plan for and decide upon the future growth and development of
their respective organizations. These challenges and opportunities are
attrlbutable, in part, to the cc_nplex and evolutionary nature of the U. S.
space effort. The technology is _ic and expanding in all direcUons;
future space missions and requirements are difficult to define; the facility
and manpower requirements change very rapidly; and the level and distri-
bution of federal expenditures for future space missions and technology are
difficult to predict. Additional complexities are introduced into an aero-
space executive's decision-making and planning process by Soviet space
activities, U. S. foreign policy developments, as well as national defense
and domestic political considerations; which all influence the magnitude
and direction of the national space effort.
In such a dynamic and complex environment, it is necessary for the
aerospace manager to have access to concise and timely information on a
broad spectrum of subjects, ranging from the impact of national policy on
the space budget, on one hand, to the status of the human economic and
facility resources of the company or government agency he represents,
on the other.
The space-age executive must also have some understanding of the
objectives of the national space program, including their relationship to
3space missions and operatio_l requirements. He must also be aware of
the significant technological developments and their effect on space systems
management and organization, as well as on the distribution and evolution
of the space budget. Even events that are not directly related to the space
program, such as the war in Vietnam, must also be considered by an aero-
space executive before he makes the necessary decisions, initiate planning
activities, or commits his organization's financial, manpower and facility
resources.
While the data an aerospace executive must evaluate are numerous,
complex and varied,discussion of all of the factors considered by aerospace
management is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, an attempt has
been made to isolate those major factors that are common to the long-range
_l.nntn_ and decision-making activities of most aerospace executLves, in
both government and private industry, these include: 1) national space
policies and objectives; 2) space missions and requirements; 3) the space
environment; 4) scientific and technical developments; 5) aerospace man-
agement and organization; 6) manpower and facility resources; 7) Soviet
space developments; 8) business competition; and 9) Federal space ex-
penditures. (Figure 1).
As previously noted the significance of any one or group of planning
factors varies from organization to organization and problem to problem.
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But in the planning and decision-making process these differences are
essentially of degree rather than of substance. For example, both indus-
trial and government aerospace executives must take national space goals
and objectives into consideration in their planning and decision making
activities. The government aerospace executive is directly involved in
shaping as well as implementing national policy, whereas his industrial
counterpart is concerned more with supporting space policies through
hardware developments. However, the industrial executive or his com-
pany shape policy indirectly through consultation with government officials
or by developing technologies which may ultimately bring about changes
in national space plans and _rograms,
NATIONAL SPACE POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES
7¢_dle the relative influence of private industry and the federal govern-
ment on space policy may be debated, it is important to stress that both
industrial and government aerospace executives in their planning or decision-
making must consider U. S. space policies and objectives since they are
the basis for allocating the manpower, dollar and technological resources
committed to space, and provide the basic management guidelines for
structuring the overall national program as well as defining the scope and
direction of specific projects.
For example, one can directly relate an official space policy, namely,
that space activities, "should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the bene-
fit of all mankind/' to NASA's Space Science and Applications Program; to a
specific budgetary appropriation; to a specific project, the TIROS satellite;
and finally to RCA, the company that designed and developed the TIROS.
Moreover, the policy "feedback" from this project, i.e., "for the
benefit of all mankind," can be shown in the form of photographic data which
have been gathered by TIROS and utilized in a direct and practical way to
support, on a global scale, such human activities as weather forecasting,
agriculture and transportaUono
U. S. space policiest as with national policy as a whole, are generated
primarily by Congress, the Executi_ Branch of the federal government and
°
private institutions (see Fig. 2). lvLore specifically, space policy is for-
mulated in the public sector by the Space Committees of the U. S. House
and the Senate; the Executive Office of the President, i.e., the Office of
Science and Technology, the Bureau of the Budget and the National Space
Council, and such Federal agencies as NASA and DOE). In the private
sector, national space policy is influenced by industry, the universities
and research institutes, and by private associations and individuals with
vested interests of one kind or another.
However, regardless of the organizational involvements or interests,
policy formulation, whether it relates to space or to other national activities,
is comprised of three basic functions: planning, decision-making, and im-
plementation. Moreover, these functions, must be carried out in a rea-
sonably structured and rational environment ff clear policy formulation
and subsequent action are to take place, in either the government or private
industry.
In the federal government the policy functions of planning, decision-
making and implementation, carried out in the context of the space programs
of NASA, DOD, the Weather Bureau and National Science Foundation, in-
volve considerations of a complex spectrum of political, social, economic
and technical factors ranging from the impact of a particular government
contract on a city or region, to the nature of the Martian atmosphere. In
some cases these factors are evaluated intuitively by the policy-makers;
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9in other cases, a particular factor or relevant problem may be analyzed
in great depth and the findings submitted in report form. These in-depth
studies may involve forecasts of the space technology state-of-the-art
extending ten to fifteen years into the future, or analyses of the long-term
economic impact of the space budget on private industry. In any case,
whether these policy factors are evaluated intuitively or analyzed in depth,
they are - in essentially normal, non-crisis situations - individually and
collectively considered by the appropriate organizations and individuals,
such as the National Space Council, Congress and NASA Management,
before th_ final policy statement is issued, the national objectives defined,
and subsequent action taken.
These space policy actions, the analyses and the management decisions
can have an impact on all levels of our society including the government,
private industry, the academic community and the general public. Whether
each of the relevant communities or institutions feel the effects at the same
time or in the same manner often depends upon the particular policy state-
ment or action. For example, the late President Kennedy's policy state-
ment in May 1961 on "Urgent National Needs", and the resulting national
commitment to land a U. S. astronaut on the moon, had wide-ranging
impacts on our society, that is still being felt today.* On the other hand,
* Government Operations in Space, Thirteenth Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, Washington, D. C., June 4, 1965, p. 2.
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the decision to proceed with the MOL program in August 1965 had impacts
that were feltprimarily by the government and private industry, and had
littleor no impact on the academic community or the general public.
Whereas, the policy decision to initiate discussions with the Soviet Union
on cooperative space efforts had an even narrower impact on the various
public and private institutions in the sense that the effect was felt primarily
at the level of the federal government.
Finally, the various organizations involved in space policy formulation,
as well as the related plans, programs, decisions and actions, are all fled
together by a feedback mechanism that operates in both direct and subtle
ways. Nevertheless, feedback occurs at all levels and at all steps in the
policy formulation process. As a consequence policy is never static but is
changed, updated and revised, as time and events as well as technological
advances and institutional requirements dictate.
Consequently, the dynamics of policy formulation create situations
wherein the relationship between national space policies and objectives,
the space programs, the resource allocations and the relevant organizations
is not clear. Confusion about these relationships can also occur when planners
and decision-makers fail to carefully examine or misinterpret our space
policies. However, in some cases the misinterpretation is a result of the
vague wording of official space policy statements. In some instances, the
11
statements' real or imagined vagueness is heightened by the debate about
our space program that exists from time to time in high political and
scientific circles** As noted in a Congressional report on "Government
Operations in Space,"** the discussion is focused on the rationale of and
policies behind the national space effort, wherein _luestions of the following
types are raised: "Is it wise to devote so large a portion of our naUonal
resources and energies to putting a man on the moon when pressing economic
and social needs go unfulfilled ? Are there derivative benefits through in-
dustrial and military applications, and to what extent do these justify the
heavy investment in the civilian space program ?
"Has the multi-billion dollar lunar landing program distorted the civil-
ian space organization and caused a wide departure from the scientific space
mission charged to NASA ?
"Are we concentrating too much on civilian space and neglecting mili-
tary space with future risk to the national security ?
"Why is it necessary to have two lines of government endeavor in
space ?
"If civilian and military agencies both must be involved, how can
overlap and duplication be eliminated or avoided?"
* Scientists Testimony onSpace Goals, Hearings before the Senate Commit-
tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C., June 1963.
* * Govt. Operations in Space, pp. 1-2.
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V_vile the Congressional report notes that several of these questions
"are mooted by time and circumstance," their existence and nature, coupled
with the fact that the same questions are asked repeatedly (and not always
by the same individuals) gives rise to the feeling that certain of our space
policies and objectives are vague or are misinterpreted by many responsible
people in our society, including planners and decision-ma_ers in government
and industry.
The first definitive statement of U. S. space policies was made in
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958; namely, "that activities in
space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefits of all man-
kind" .... and "that the general welfare and security of the United States re-
quire that adequate provisions be made for aeronautical and space activities."
These "aeronautical and space activities," in turn are to be conducted so as
to contribute materially to one or more of the following goals: *
• The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmos-
phere and space;
• The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety,
and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles;
Q The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying
instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms througIz
space;
* Summary Report, Future Programs Task Group, A report by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to the President, printed for the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, Washington, D. C., April 1965, p.2.
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The establishment of long-range stndies of the potentialbenefits
to be gained from the opportunities for, and the problems in-
volved in the utilizationof aeronautical and space activitiesfor
peaceful and scientificpurposes;
The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in
aeronautical and space science and technology and in the appli-
cation thereof to the conduct of peaceful activitieswithin and
outside the almosphere;
The making available to agencies directly concerned with national
defense of discoveries thathave military value of significance,
and the furnishing by such agencies, to the civilianagency estab-
lished to direct and control non-military aeronautical and space
activities,of information as to discoveries which have value
or significance to thatagency;
CooperRtion by the United States with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful
application of the results thereof; and
The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering
resources of the United States, with close cooperation among
all interested agencies of the United States in order to avoid
unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities and equipment.
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To support these policies and objectives, Congress has authorized a
twenty-fold increase in the total fvderal space budget, from _348 million
in 1958 to more than $7 billion in 1966; the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency has been created; and a wide variety of costly and complex programs
such as Gemini, Apollo, and MOL have been initiated. Furthermore, twenty
thousand individual companies as well as hundreds of colleges and universities
have committed significant percentages of their scientific and industrial
resources to meet our national goals in space.
Since the Space Act was passed, the original policies and objectives
of the space program have been modified, as time and events required. As
previously noted, one of the most significant changes was suggested by the
late President Kennedy on May 25, 1961, in a speech before Congress on
"Urgent National Needs." Mr. Kennedy stated: "It is time for this nation
to take a clearly leading role in space achievement which in many ways may
hold the key to our future on earth," adding "I believe that this nation should
commit itself to achieving the goal before this decade is out, of landing a
man on the moon and returning him safely to earth."*
For example, on the day following his speech to Congress, President
Kennedy submitted requests for an additional $549 million for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration including an increase in appropriations
* Urgent National Needs, A Special Message to Congress by President Kennedy,
published by the Department of State, Washington, D. C., May 25, 1961.
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for manned space flight acUvities from $104 millio_to $234 million. In
addition, the funds for the large launch vehicles associated with the man-
in-space program were increased from $224 to $273 million.
In the weeks and months that followed, our national space plans were
revised, new organizations and facilities within NASA, such as the office
of Manned Space Flight and the Manned Spacecraft Center were ereated_
supplementary man-in-space programs such as Gemini and the Saturn V,
were initiated, the initial goat to land a U. S. astronaut on the moon was
re-evaluated, and the date for the lunar landing was changed from the
post-1970 to pre-1970 time period. Even the selection of the technique
for landing men on the moon was influenced by the new objective and the
associated time schedule. *
As a consequence of the late President*s acUoii, dynamic changes
also took place in private industry; the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company and General Electric established new corporate organizations
(e. g., Bellcomm) to provide NASA with systems analysis and integration
support in meeting the new goals of the man-in-space program. Furthermore,
industrial executives and planners in aerospace companies throughout the
United States revised their corporate goals and objectives and refocused
• 'Report on Space Programs," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists _ Vol. 19
(1963) p pp. 22.
16
the human, material and financial resources of their respective companies
in the direction of the new U. S. goal to land men on the moon before 1970.
A more recent shift in our national space policy, namely, the decision,
in August 1965, to go ahead with the development of the Manned Orbital Lab-
oratory, has had its effect, not only on the structure and scope of the national
space effort, but on the plans and decisions of aerospace managers in both
government and industry. For example, the decision on MOL, according
to a recent Congressional report, would represent a sizeable new commit-
ment in space. * The report also found tl_t the development and launching
of the first series of MOL vehicles would cost at least a billion dollars,
noting further that references have been made to bigger and more complex
space stations which would increase this initial estimate to five to ten
billion dollars.
The present and future scope of the MOL program ]ms raised a number
of policy questions which have yet to be fully and adequately answered, namely:
Is it necessary to develop a manned orbital laboratory to validate military
missions in space ? And: can a manned space station be utilized by both
NASA and DOD ? The answer to the first question was partially answered
when Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the Manned Orbital
* Govt. O]_erations in Space, p. 9
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Laboratory would be developed, adding, that it was necessary to put men
in space for an extendedperiod and to conduct certain experiments to deter°
mine the military value of a manned space station. * This was a departure
from earlier DOD policy statements that there was no clearly defined military
role for men in space.
The second policy question relative to the MOL: Can a manned space
station be utilized by both NASA and DOD? can be answered affirmatively,
even though some experiments will have special military implications. Most
of them. however, will produce scientific, technical and operational data
which are not specifically military or non-military, but can be of value to
both DOD and NASA.
As a consequence of this somewhat paradoxical situation, coupled
with the estimated heavy cost of this new program, some concern and con-
fusion have been generated, particularly about DOD's and NASA's plans
and proposals for future manned space stations. This has prompted some
Congressional and industrial spokesmen to suggest a merger of space station
requirements in a single national program that would serve both NASA and
the Department of Defense. In addition, the fact that both NASA and DOD
have sponsored extensive studies by private industry to determine each
agencies specific and separate needs adds further to the confusion and debate
i
* Ibid p. 9.
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over the policy implications andthe relative roles of NASAand DODin the
development of a mannedspacestation. This, in turn, gives rise to additions/
questions from industrial and Congressional circles, namely: Can a single
space station program fulfill both NASA Vs and DODts requirements? Which
agencyts requirements are paramount? Who should manage and fund the
program ? What design should be chosen ?
In the minds of many planners and decision-makers these questions
have not been resolved by the MOL decision. In fact it is still difficult for
some members of Congress and industry to determine which agency, DOD
or NASA will develop and manage the first fully operational space station.
As an illustration, some industrial executives still base their plans and
related developmental efforts on the possibility that NASA will eventually
manage the first manned space station; others bet on DOD; still other exec-
utives try to maintain a flexible planning approach, hoping that whichever
agency, or combination of agencies, manages the program, their company
will benefit. Again, each executive bases his plans and decisions on his
interpretation of the facts and an evaluation of what he belives our national
space policies and objectives to be.
In addition to our own technological developments, such as MOL,
the development of a military version of the Kosmos or Voskhod spacecraft
by the Soviet Union might force the United States to alter the essentially
peaceful policies and objectives of our space program as well as the scope
19
of individual projects. For example, the existence of a Soviet military
capability in space would probably result in a counter development by the
United States with consequent shifts in the budgetary, management and tech-
nological structure of the current space program. Or, if positive evidence
was received that the Soviet Union was going to land men on the moon before
1969 there is a distinct possibility that the present national objectives--to
carry out a manned lunar landing before 1970--would bare to be re-evalmted
and the related schedules, technology and budgets modified. These changes,
in turn, would have a significant effect on the strategy, plans and resource
requirements of most of the current aerospace organizations, particularly
those involved in the Apollo program.
As previously noted, developments that are not directly related to
space and space technology can also affect our space policies and objectives.
One such example is the establishment by President Johnson in August, 1965,
of a "new" federal Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. This system
will have significant and far-reaching impacts on the management of the
federal government, particularly on the federal policy and decision-making
process, on the relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government and on the responsibilities and prerogatives of the various
federal agencies including NASA. For example, not only will the total NASA
program be structured on the basis of the PPB System, but within the Bureau
2O
of the Budget, the overall NASA program will be compared in terms of
its cost and effectiveness with defense, transportation and urban housing
programs and budgets. As a consequence, this new management system will,
in turn, affect NASA's decision-making and planning activities as well as those
of private industry; in particular those companies that deal directly with the
agency. Moreover, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System will be
employed to evaluate the post-Apollo space goals including the manned space
station, the lunar base and manned planetary exploration.
Therefore, with the introduction of the PPB System into the federal
decision-making process, it is not only essential for governmen[ and indus-
trial managers to examine and analyze the space program and related policies
as a separate unit, but to compare such programs and policies with other
national goals in such areas as transportation, health, education and welfare,
Another development that will have an increasingly important effect
on space goals and objectives is the growing application of aerospace systems
management and analysis techniques to non-aerospace problems. These
techniques have been effectively applied by the State of California, which
recently asked systems engineers, employed by California's defense and
space industry, to study four major problems affecting the state; namely:
1) transportation, 2) pollution, 3) data collection, and 4) crime. These
studies have been completed and the results and recommendations are being
successfully applied. The significance of these studies and the need to apply
aerospace management tectmtques to other non-space problems has been
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voiced by a number of high government and industrial officials. This, in turn,
indicates a growing concern and desire to apply space management techniques
and technology to other national problems. If this were to take place on a
gradtmlly increasing scale, a sigrAflcant modification of our space policies
and objectives could take place, particularly if a growing percentage of the
human and material resources now devoted to space research were applied
to other national activities.
Another factor that has affected our space goals and objectives is the
war in Vietnam. While current national commitments and projects such
as Apollo will not be greatly affected, there is no question that the Vieinamese
war has bad a delaying effect on decisions relative to future post-Apollo
goals and programs. How seriously this will affect the future space effort
cannot be determined at this time since it is dependent, to a major degree,
on the future scope of the war and the level of U. S. defense and political
commitments.
On the other hand t improvements in the Vietnam situation as well
as in the international climate, as a whole, could also lead to a redefinition
of our national space policies and objectives. For example, if a reduction
in cold war tension were to take place, it is possible that the present agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the U. S., to cooperate in the coordinated
launchings of weather and geomagnetic satellites, might be expanded to
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include a joint effort by the U. S., and the USSR to construct a lunar base
or carry out an interbational expedition to _iars. If such arrangements
were to become national goals, our current space program schedules, pro-
ject prioriUes and budgets would be significantly modified and, consequently,
so would the plans and objectives of the aerospace industry.
Therefore, it is essential for aerospace management to consider
national space policies and objectives in terms of: 1) their historical
context; 2) the factors that influence their modification and evolution; and
3) their effect on such things as federal expenditures, technological deve-
lopments and industrial growth.
SPACE MISSIONS ANI; OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Space missions and operatioDal requirements are specific statements
of how our national space policies and objectives will be met. As such,
they are the basis for overall program planning and affect, in a direct way,
system design, costs and project resource allocations.
However, it is often difficult for aerospace managers to correlate
national space policies and objectives with specific missions and require-
ments because space policies are usually stated in very abstract terms, e.g.,
"the preservation of the role of the United States as leader in aeronautical
and space science... ," while the space missions and requirements are de-
fined in terms of specific programs, functionS, or needs, e.g., manned
space flight, space defense, or planetary exploration.
In addition to being a reflection of national policy, space missions
and requirements are dependent on three b_ic factors: 1) specific national
objectives; 2) the needs and responsibilities of the using agency; and 3) the
interaction between a specific technology and its operational environment.
This relationship between national objectives, agency responsibil-
ities, technology and the environmeat, and their collective influence on specific
missions and operational requirements was most clearly defined in the period
between 1900 and 1950, when the needs of a growing economy coupled to
advances in technology made it possible, for the first time in history, for
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large military and civilian transport systems to simultaneously evolve and
function in three distinct environments: land, sea, and air. For example,
modern, highly mobile ground armies and transportation networks came into
being in the period between 1915 and 1940 when specific national defense or
civil needs were coupled to specific technologies, i.e., the gasoline or diesel
engine, and the wheel and gear, and the stressed steel shell which resulted
in the development of locomotives, automobiles, trucks, and armored t_ks.
To a marked degree the design, operational requirements and missions of
these vehicles and their supporting raft and road networks were influenced
by the terrain, i.e., environment, over which they were built or operated.
During the same period, modern sea-based transportation systems
and naval weapons evolved when military and civil missions and requirements,
and specific technologies (steam generators and steel hulls) were employed
in a particular environment (the sea). As a consequence, naval forces and
maritime transportation, with their unique missions increased in importance
as contributors to the economic health and military power of this and other
western nations. For the most part, the design and operational distinctions
between the missions, operational requirements, and technological charac-
teristics of a sea-based system as compared with those of a land-based system,
were obvious during this period. *
• In some unique eases (i.e., amphibious vehicles), land and sea operations
and their related technologies are combined into one system.
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The evolution of highly mechanized ground and sea-based systems,
designed for specific military or civil functions or requirements, was closely
paralleled in the first fifty years of the twentieth century by the development
of aircraft which carried out their own unique missions in a specific environ-
ment: the atmosphere. However, air transportation and aerial warfare did
not become of prime significance until World War II when reciprocating and
jet engines were coupled to the all-metal airframe. Following the war, the
importance of aircraft technology to the national security and economy of this
country was highlighted by the creation of a separate Air Force in 1947, and
the growth of commercial airlines, which expanded and began to compete
with the railroad and maritime transportation systems.
In each of the above cases the marriage of a specific national require-
ment and a specific technology to a particular environment influenced the
development of separate air, sea, and ground systems and their related
doctrines, missions and operational capabilities.
These basically different systems had one common characteristic,
however; they all operated on or very near the surface of the earth, in an
essentially flat, two dimensional environment, with geographic and techno-
logical limitations on their mission, range, and operating time.
These operational limitations were overcome to a significant degree
during the 1950's when rocket and space technology became a significant
factor in man's activities. Now he could operate away from the surface
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of the earth, in a vastly larger, three dimensional environment where there
were few restrictions on the time, velocity or range of operations. However,
because man has a natural tendency to evaluate and apply new technological
developments within a framework o£ current and past experience, space
technology applications were considered by many as only a supplement to
existing terrestrial activities. This was particularly evident in the military
hierarchy where individual service interests and operational methods, as
well as organizational rivalries, led to the creation o£ separate and competing
Army, Navy, and Air Force space programs in the late 1950's. One of the
arguments employed at that time to justify this duplication of effort was
that space activities were just natural extensions of existing Army, Navy and
Air Force operations.
While there is some basis for this argument, particularly in the case
of orbital missions--where a more direct application of space technology
to man's activities on earth can take place--it ignores or minimizes the
possibility that space and space technology--including the missions and oper-
ational requirements--are in many ways unique and distinct from most terres-
trial activities.
At the present time space missions and the related operational require-
ments are defined almost entirely on the basis of separate agency responsi-
bilities and needs, rather than on overall national requirements. While
there is a total national space program in concept, at the organizational
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and operational levels there are two seml-autonomous programs with NASA
responsible for the larger scientific, developmental and exploratory effort
and DOD, i.e., the Air Force, responsible for the military space effort.
While the structure and orientation of the space program is partially an
outgrowth of past policies and decisions made in response to Sputnik I, the
duality of the program is based primarily on operational considerations with
duplication and program overlap minimized through a series of NASA-DOD
coordinating boards, panels and committees.
Under this arrangement NASA and DOD initiate and manage their
individual space programs to meet specific agency missions and require-
ments. Where these missions and requirements are distinctly different,
as would be the case in comparing NASA*s planetary exploration and DOD*s space
defense missions, separate program management, missions and operational
requirements prevail. However, when both agencies have a similar mission
and operational requirement, such as Manned Space Flight, the management/
mission/requirement distinctions are vague and tend to overlap. In such
situations special coordinating arrangements must be established. (See
"Space Program Ma]mgement and Organization," pp. 91-92).
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Under the present arrangement NASA and DOD have structured their
programs and missions as follows:
NASA
MANNED SPAC_ FLIGHT
SPACE SCIENC -,7.AND APPLICATIONS
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION "
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
COMMUNICATIONS
NAVIGATION
SPACEBORNE DETE CTION
SPACE DEFENSE
DOD
VEHICLE AND ENGINEERING
DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND
DEVE LOPME NT
SPACE GRO_JND SUPPORT
GENERAL SUPPORT
The above program categories are stlmctured primarily on the basis
of separate agency missions and responsibilities. However, a close exmmination
of the general program or functional categories listed under each agency,
indicates that there are more program and mission similarities between
NASA and DOD than is apparent at first glance. For example, both NASA
and DOD have manned space flight missions and programs. NASA's Space
Science and Applications Program includes many separate projects that are
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essentially analogous to a series of individual DOD space activities carried
out in the areas of Communications, Navigation and Space-borne Detection.
NASA_s Advanced Research and Technology Program and missions are
functionally similar to the combined DOD categories of Vehicle and Engineering
Development, and Supporting Research and Development; whereas, NASA's
Tracking and Data Acquisition programs and missions are somewhat akin to
a combination of DODOs Space Ground Support and General Support categories.
Nevertheless, in spite of these functional program and mission simi-
htritiss, the belief that this country has two distinctly separate space efforts,
carried on by two separate federal agencies still persists.
In some cases planners and decision-makers, particularly in industry,
have operated on the basis of separate civil and military space programs.
In other oases, industrt_lmanagers and their planning staffs have considered
the DOD and NASA programs an complementary elements of a single national
space effort and have structured and implemented their plans accordingly.
One approach employed by space-age .planners to define space missions
in terms of national rather than separate agency needs is to subdivide the
missions into general, functional, and regional categories (see Fig. 3).
Thegeneral category is comprised of manned, unmanned, military and
non-military missions. The general mission oategory can then be sub-
divided into functional missions, including: 1) research and development,
which involves the testing and improvement of hardware and the perfection
3O
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of operational techniques; 2) space exploration, i.e., missions related to
the expansion of the Space "frontier'* and the collection and interpretation
of new data; and 3) space support, which encompasses a variety of missions
including: military/non-military reconnaissance; launching, tracking, and
recovery operations; and space logistics, L e., maintenance, re-supply and
cargo transport.
It is significant that the current U. S. space activities as redefined
under the first three functional missions, i.e., research and development,
space exploration and space support, including the related spacecraft systems,
are presently the joint responsibility of DOE) and NASA. (k_ the other hand0
there are two additional functional space missions which are entirely military.
These are: space offense, which would include counter-force and counter-
value attacks against earth, lunar, or space-based targets; and space defense,
including active and/or passive defense against earth, lunar, or space-based
weapons.
Another basis for classifying space missions is to define them re_onally,
i.e., missions that are carried out in a specific area of space having unique
physical and operational characteristics. For example, suborbital missions
typified by the earlier Mercury-_.edstone flights would involve ballistic or
semi-ballistic flights extending from the surface of the earth out to a distance
of 100 miles. Earth orbital missions, as flown in the Mercury, Gemini, and
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MOL spacecraft would include single, multiple, or sustained orbit flights
carried out in a region lying between 100 and 20,000 miles from the earth's
surface. Cislunar missions, involving such vehicles as the Lunik m, which
took the first pictures of the far side of the moon, would be conducted in a
zone lying between the earth orbital and the lunar orbital regions; whereas
lunar missions would be carried out directly on the moon's surface by space-
craft such as the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) and Lmm 9, Fi_ly, the
p]znetary missions would be those involving spacecraft such as the Mariner
or Voyager, launch_l on in_er'planetary trajectories into a region extending
tens-to- hundreds of millions of miles beyond the earth, to the planets of our
solar system_
Aetospace _anners fecoEhize that regional space missions have been
and will continue to be carried out by military, as well as non-mil|tary
spacecraft. However, the non-military space program--which has moved
ahead of military space activities (in terms of hardware development and
time schedules} in the exploration of earth orbital space--will continue to
maintain this lead in the exploration of cislunar, lmmr, and planetary space.
This forward thrust by the non-military space effort into the outer limits
of space cannot be paralleled by a military space program if for no other
reason than it becomes increasingly difficult (in spite of any existing tech-
nological capabilities) to establish military missions and requirements as the
zone of operation shifts away from the earth orbital, to the lunar and planetary
regions.
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To support the various military and non-military missions, space
systems have to meet certain basic operational requirements which aerospace
planuers, in turn t must take into consideration (see Fig. 3 ). These require-
ments include reliability, which may have a certain range of acceptable values
depending on the complexity of the spacecraft and the mission to be performed.
For example, an unmanned vehicle designed for a single earth orbit would
not necessarily have to have as high a degree of reliability as an unman,_l
vehicle launched on a trajectory to Mars where the spacecraftls operational
life is measured in months rather than hours. On the other hand, a manned
spacecraft launched into a single earth orbit may have to have a higher order
of reliability for crew survival, than an unmanned communication satellite
designed for a synchronous earth orbit.
Anotl_r basic space systems requireme_lt is o_erational flexibility.
Defined as the degree to which a given space system can operate in a variety
of mission modes, operational flexibility is essentially a function of the space
systemls design (particularly its weight and volume) and the requirements
of the using agency. For example, the Apollo spacecraft has a high degree
of operational flexibility in the sense that it will be used for earth orbital,
cislunar and lunar landing missions and has a broad range of other potential
applications; whereas Mercury, designed specifically to launch the first
U. S. astronaut into orbit, had very little operational flexibility.
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Another spacesystems operational requirement is malntaimbflity.
A function of system's complexity, reliability and operational mode, it is
measured by, the level of skills required, the number and complexity of
maintezance procedures and the degree of component and sub-syst_n's ac-
cessibility existing in a given spacecraft. A high order of maintainability
is a particularly imporlant requirement for military space systems and has
a direct bearing on the operating costs of all types of space vehicles; a factor
that must be considered by aerospace planners and systems designers.
Re-useability, another requirement; is defined as the capability of
a space vehicle to be launched more than once in a given mission mode. It
is a function of tim vehicle's design, its mission and the requirements of the
using agency, at¢l can be measured in terms of the cost (in doll's) per pound
of spacecraft launched into orbit, To date spacecraft and booster systems
that have a high degree of re-useabflity have not been put into operation,
but are under design and development for future space operations, particularly
where repetitive launchings may be required. One such vehicle is the Scramjet,
an air-breathing system, which in some configurations could be designed to
repeatedly launch a large number of payloads and return, after each launching,
to its home base. This vehicle would have a high degree of re-useability as
compared with a Saturn booster which can only be used once.
Another space systems operational requirement is accuracy, defined
as the ability of the total system (launch vehicle and spacecraft) to operate
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within an acceptable range of geometric error, or to arrive at a given point
in space with the required velocity and orientation. In the case of an offensive
or defensive space weapon, the CEP and/or kill potential delivered against
a fixed or moving target is an additional parameter employed to measure
the spacecraftls accuracy requirement.
Growth Potential, i.e., the capability of a given space system to evolve
into a more advanced design is also a basic operational requirement which
must be considered by space planners and designers, it is a function of the
spacecraftts design and mission, as well as the operational needs of the
using agency. For example • the Saturn and Titan boosters as well as Apollo
ale spa_e systems with a relatively tiigh growth potential; whereas Vanguard,
Atlas, and Mercury were systems with a low growth potential, In another
sense high growth potential allows flexible and long-term (thus lower cost)
use of a space system. A spacecraft with low growth po_ntial inhibits its
flexibility and long-term use.
Survivability is another basic space system requirement. In a non-
military environment this is defined as the ability of the spacecraft and the
crew to survive in the face of a hostile, but natural threat, e.g., collision
with a meteorite, or intense solar radiation. In a military enviroment,
systems survivability is considered more in terms of a man-made threat
(i.e., offensive weapons). In a military environment systems survivability
is attained through dispersal, hardening, defensive armaments, mobility
and/or maneuverability.
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In addition, there are military and non-military space systems which
have a requirement for rapid reaction. This is a function of the systemts
mission mode, reliability and complexity. In a non-military environment,
a requirement for rapid reaction would exist in a simultaneous spacecraft
launching, such as Gemini 6 and 7, where orbital rendezvous is the object,
and where the time and launching window criteria are limited. In a military
environment, a quick reaction capability may be required to destroy an enemy
satellite, to permit a friendly space system to survive a surprise attack, or
assure crew survivability during attack.
THE SPACS. ENVIRONMENT
The importance of the space environment to aerospace planning and
decision-making has increased significantly since January 31, 1958 when
the first American satellite, Explorer I, was placed into orbit. Since
that date the space program has slowly gathered momentum and passed a
nnmber of primary milestones, including the series of Mercury and Gemini
spacecraft launchings. These flights marked the beginning of an exploratory
program that will take man and machines farther and further into an essen-
tially unknown environment Which extetxds from the earth's atmosphere to
the surface of the moon and beyond, to planets of our solar system.
The space environment not only has a direct effect on spacecraft
design and operation but consequently on program costs, lead times and
launching schedules, as well as man's functions and survival. Therefore,
an understanding of these various effects of the space environment is an
important input to any "space age" planning or decision-making activity.
For example, in deciding on the level of funding for a specific space project,
an aerospace manager might have to ask and obtain answers to such questions
as the following: What is the correlation between the physical nature of the
space environment and the development costs of this proposed project? To
what extent will space environment affect its launching schedule, and there-
fore, the U. S. - USSR "space race" ? What are some of the design problems
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associated with long-time distance flights to the planets of our solar system ?
What kinds of facilities and funds will he required to simulate the space en-
vironment? In what ways will the lunar environment hamper mants functions?
Enhance his functions ?
The space environment has been described as a radiation contimmm,
containing thinly dispersed gaseous matert_ and spiced with sharp meteoric
pepper.* More specifically, it is characterized by solar and cosmic radiation
which can dam_e or kill unprotected organisms, temperature extremes,
weightlessness, meteorites, and gravitational forces which differ greatly
from those experienced on earth. In space, distances between points range
from a few hundreds to millions of miles, and spacecraft flight times, as
compared with those of aircraft operating in the terrestrial atmosphere,
are measu_exl in terms of days, weeks, or months, rather than hours. All
of these factors, individually and in combination have an effect on the planat_
and the design, as well as on the operation, cost of and reliability of booster,
electronic and spacecraft systems.
The physical nature of the space environment is not uniform; it differs
aigniflcantly from place to place (see Fig. 4). Its basic characteristics are
altered by the sun and the planets as well as by the magnetic forces which
* Howard S. Seifeit (ed.), Space Technology (New York: John Wiley
&Sons, Inc., 1959).
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emanate from these bodies. For example, the earth's magnetic field strongly
influences the influx of solar and cosmic rays and the formation of the radi-
ation belts which are composed primarily of high energy electrons and protons.
These belts are one of the most significant factors affecting space-
craft operation and crew survival. Within the radiation belts the radiation
intensity increases by factor of several thousand between 300 and 1,000
miles, where it may reach as much as ten roentgens per hour--enough to
deliver an average lethal dose in two days to an unshielded human being. *
However, current data indicates that the radiation intensity falls off rapidly
at a distance of roughly 20,000 miles above the earth. Consequently, it would
be dangerous for a manned spacecraft to stay within the region of high-density
radiation for an extended period of time, but for most missions (particularly
those involving earth escape) a short period of time in the region of high in-
tensity, or spacecraft exit or reentry at the polar regions where the earth's
radiation is at a minimum, may be all that is required. Some shielding may
be necessary, however, to protect the crew, on extended earth-orbital mis-
sions, but the overall spaoecraft weight could be held doWn to a mini-
mum, through the use of radiation shielding based on sandwich structures
comprised of thin layers of lead, aluminum and/or plastic.
* Space Handbook, Report of the House Committee on Astronautics and
Space Exploration, Washington, D. C., February 24, 1959, p. 16.
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The sunalso influences the radiation levels in the spaceenvironment.
R is most intense afar solar flares which discharge clouds of almost pure
protons into space. When these particles reach the vicinity of the earth, they
not only produce abrupt changes in the intensity of the natural rad_flon
trapped in the belts around the earth but also.eo_tions blackouts
and auroral displays. If an astronaut got caught in a cloud of these particles,
no reasonable amount of shielding could protect him. If the big flares were
anticipated, long,range flights would have to be cancelled. Solar flares could
also affect our ability to land men on the moon, and thereby interrupt our
time schedule for getting to the lunar surface. In addition, high energy particles
associated with solar flares are a hazard to spacecraft operating in earth
orbits greater than 50 degrees inclination and altitudes above 10,000 miles. *
Man and his machines wtll also be affected by the meteoroids and
meteoric materials that exist in the space environment. Meteoroids are
believed to originate from cometary tails and the asteroid belt and their
intensity variesfrom a light and random influx to brief intense showers. **
Based on data gathered by unmanned satellites, it is estimated that roughly
2,000 tons of this "spatial debris" enter the earthls atmosphere each day;
* Space Planners Guide (Washington: United States Air Force, Air Force
Systems Command, 1965), p.II-10.
** Aerospace Technical Forecast_ 1962-1972 (Washington: Aerospace
Industries Association of America, 1962)_ p. 12.
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however, most of the meteoric particles are too small to be lmzardous to
man and equipment in space, even though they reach velocities of 7 to 45 miles
per second. Consequently, the probability of penetration of the spacecraft's
thin skin is low. However, for spacecraft operating for extended periods
of time in the space environment, the erosive, sazzl blasting effects of these
particles could affect the performance and realiabfltty of the spacecraft, as
well as the emotional stress levels of the crew.
Along with the dangers of radiation and meteoric penetration, the
spacecraft and Its crew will he affected by the weightlessness that exists
in the space environment. As outlined in the USAF Space Planners Guide,
the problems of weightlessness can be divkled into two classes: operational
and medical. * The operational problems result from the effects of weight-
lessness on such space crew tasks as eaUng, washing, and the use of tools
and instruments. By comparison, the medical effects of weightlessl_ss
are more severe and ff prolonged can result in a degeneration of the crew
members' skeletal, cardiovascular and muscular system, to a point where
permanent physical damage may result. As a consequence knowledge about
these effects on the crew is essential to the planning and design of adequate
training facfliUes, simulators, and crew compartments, and particularly,
the planning of long-duration manned missions to the planets.
* Space Planners Guide, p. H-17.
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In addition to the danger of radiation and meteoric penetration, as
well as the effects of weightlessness, the spacecraft structures, the equipment
and the crew will be affected by wide temperature variations onboth short and
long duration flights into space. During reent_, for example, spacecraft
will be subjected to temperatures ranging from 1,000o to 6,000 ° Farenheit,
and on extended flights into space the spacecraft will experience wide tmnper-
sture extremes over its entire surface, depending on its distance from and
relative orientation to the sun. Fox example, a spacecraft operating in the
vicinity of Venus win receive about 50 times more heat per square inch of
surface than it would if it were operating in the vicinity of Jupiter. * Conse-
quently, a vehicle equipped for a trip to Venus is not (from a structural and
temperature control viewpoint) necessarily suited for a trip to Jupiter.
Temperature will be a critical planning factor in those operations and equlp-
ment design areas involving crew exit from the spacecraft for extended periods
of time. For example, special space suits, which take the extreme tempera-
ture conditions in space into consideration, will be required. However, in
space the heat flux through the space suit will depend on so many factors that
special suits may have to be designed for special missions. **
* "The Medical Aspects of Space Flight," in Seifect, op. cit., p. 28-08.
** Space Planners Guide, p. II-18.
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As more extendedmissions in spaceare carried out, the problem
of equipment reliability, weight andvolume, as well as man's survival in
a closed ecological environment becomesignificant in the planning and design
of space systems (Fig. 5 ). This will be particularly true where flight, or
on-station times in excess of two weeks are experienced. Not only does
equipment reliability become a critical factor on extended flights into the
space environment, but where manned systems are involved there must be
equipment on board for partial or total recovery of water, food and oxygen,
as well as for decontamination of the air supply.
Consequently, it is important in any "space age" _ and decision-
making activity to eohside_ the effects of the space ehvironmeht on such
things as spacecraft launching and flight-time schedules (as affected by
solar flares and celestial mechanics), on system costs (as affected by ra-
diation shielding, temperature control and flight-time requirements), and
on the survival of man himself (as affected by long and dangerous voyages
into planetary and deep cosmic space.
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TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Of the many factors considered by aerospace executives in their
plannJ_ and decision-making functions, technology is one of the most--if
not the most--significant. Not only do technological considerations shape
and motivate the executive's decision-making process, but they affect the
very character of the organization he directs and controls: its organizational
structure; its competitive position; its financial status; and its future growth
and sturvival,
The impact of technological developments, however j extends beyond
the realm of specific companies and organizations. In fact, technology has
affected virtually every facet of society; its institutions, its people, and its
political, economic and social fabric. This interaction between society and
technology and its specific impact on the public and private decision-making
process was vividly demonstrated by the events that followed the launching
of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union. Excluding the initial public reactions ranging
from skepticism to alarm, Sputnik ultimately caused the United States to re-
examine its strengths and weaknesses, particularly in the areas of missile
and space technology, as well as public and private education. As a conse-
quence, decisions with far-reaching implications were made within the various
branches of the Federal government. Large sums of money, lnitally in the
several hundreds of millions and later several billions of dollars, were
appropriated and spent to meet the challenge of the Sputnik; new organizations
47
such as NASA were created; certain industries modified their management,
engineering and production structures to support the space effort; and large
numbers of American citizens with the necessary administrative, scientific
and technical skills began to move to areas where the new space facilities
were being built. *
In addition, technology became a big factor in internztional prestige.
For example, the underdeveloped as well as the mature nations began to see
the conflict between the United States and Russia in the new light, in the
sense that the Soviet Sputniks gave positive, aS well as "between the lines"
indications of Russian military and technical power vis-a-vis the United
States which had never been demonstrated so dramatically before. Space
and space technology very quickly became internationalized and its termin-
ology accepted as part of a new international language.
However, "space technology _. is a term with many meanings. To
define the term in a context that is relevant to the aerospace planning and
decision-making process it is necessary to consider space technology as
consisting of two distinct but related categories: modular technology and
systems technology (see Fig 6 ). Modular technology includes rocket
propulsion (chemical, nuclear, electric); auxiliary power (solar, chemical,
nuclear); electronics (data processing, radar, communications, command
and control, telemetry); space medicine (human factors, environmental
• See-Svace Age Boom is Bringing Revolution to the Southwest;' New York
Times, August 25, 1963, p. 56.
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control, crew survival); and materials (plastics, metals, ceramics). Systems
technology--a composite of several modular technologies--includes space-
craft systems (e.g., Apollo}; launch vehicle rsystoms (e.g., Saturn); and
o_vemtior_al support systems (e.g., the Manned Spacecraft Center).
Modular Teclmology
To maintain our pre-eminence in space and aeronautics and to lay
a basic foundation for planning and decisioh-making relative to future objec-
tives and programs in space it has been necessary for the federal govern-
ment and private industry to initiate and support a broad and varied R & D
program in modular technolog_v, which, in turn, provides an aerospace
planner and decision-maker with a variety of technical options to plan for
and meet new and emerging space requirements. As stated by former
NASA official,Dr. Raymond L, Bisplinghoff:
The existence of several technical options is fundamental
to sound planning of national objectives. Because of the
immense social, economic, scientific, political and mili-
tary implOSions 0_ space missions, policy planners win
demand in the future that they be given options in the se-
lection of new missions. *
One of the most significant efforts in modular technology involves the
development by the federal government and private industry of a wide range of roc
* 1_966 NASA _Authorization, Hearings before the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Part 4, Washington, D. C., March 1965, p. 295.
5O
propulsion calmbfllties. These public and private R & D activities, carried
on over the last twenty years have led to the development of rocket engines
such as the North Ameriean H-1 with a thrust of 150,000 to 188t000 pounds_
which was used to power the Atlas booster that placed the first U. S. astro-
naut in orbit. Eight of the H-1 engines providing a total of 1.5 million pounds
of thrust are used for the first stage of the Saturn I booster, and an uprated
version of the H-1 with a single-chamber thrust of 200,000 pounds will, in
an eight-chambered cluster, provide a total of 1.6 million pounds of thrust
to the first stage of the more advanced Saturn IB. However, the H-1 will
eventually be replaced--as a first stage engine--by the more powerful F-1
which will produce 1.5 million pounds of thrust in a single chamber. A
cluster of five F-11s, delivering a total thrust of ?.5 million pounds, will
power the first stage of SaturnV, a booster capable of placing more than
250,000 pounds into low earth orbit ancl 90,000 pounds on the moon.
Also under development is the J-2, an oxygen/hydrogen fueled engine
with a thrust of 200,000 pounds. This rocket in clustered configurations
will power the upper stages of the Saturn IB and Saturn V. In addition,
developmental research is continuing, at minimum funding levels, on even
higher thrust liquid and solid fueled engines than those presently in operation
or under development.
In addition to the chemlcaHy fueled engines, nuclear powered rockets
such as NERVA are under development. This engine could be employed in
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the upper stages for advanced Saturn V configurations for high-payload earth-
orbit, lmmr or Mars missions. Also in the developmental research stage
are air breathing and nuclear-electric systems which will provide auxiliary
aud/or primary propulsion modules for advanced spacecraft.
As previously noted_ the significance of these developments in rocket
propulsion to management planning and decision-making is sometimes over-
looked. Yet it was the lead established by the Soviet Union in rocket engine
and hoosier technology which enabled the Soviets to launch the first satellite,
to place the first man in orbit, to take the first photographs of the far side
of the moon, and to catty out a simultaneous latmching of two Vostok capsules
in August 1962. These accomplishments have added to their teclmo-military
statur inter  nal presUge,
For example j the development of a family of higher thrust and more
efficient rocket engines permits a nation to launch increasingly larger pay-
loads into space. This is not only a prime factor in the race for space
supremacy, but a large payload also provides a high degree of operational
flexibility. For example, a 1000-pound spacecraft, designed for earth orbital
missions, is restricted in weight_ volume and kinds of equipment it can
carry and, consequently, the missions it can perform. On the other hand,
a 100,000-pound orbital spacecraft has a high degree of operational flexibility,
inasmuch as it can carry a wider variety of scientific and/or military
52
equipments. This not only tends to reduce the number of boosters and
individual spacecraft required to meet a specific objective (such as landing
men on the moon or assembling a manned space station) but permits a re-
duction in launching costs as well. *
Another significant area of modular technology receiving increased
attention from aerospace management is that involving auxiliary power
packages, inasmuch as all space vehicles regardless of their size or mission,
require auxiliary power for communications, data processing and sensing.
Moreover any life-support system is critically dependent upon a reliable
source of electric power.
There are three principal types of auxiliary power systems: chemical,
solar and nuclear. Their selection and use depends Upon the required power
level and the electrical energy requirements for a given mission. **
To date, the major electrical power source for both manned and
unmanned spacecraft has been fuel cells, batteries and solar cells. As
space missions become more complex, higher power levels than those
presently available will be required. These requirements in all likelihood
will be met by nuclear-electric systems.
* H. H. KoeHe, "Missiles and Space Systems--1962," Astronautics,
Vol. 7 (1962), 29.
** NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964, Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C., p. 361.
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As the spaceprogram evolves, auxiliary power packagesranging in
output from hundreds of kilowatts to many megawatts will be required.
Representative applications of suchpower levels include manned space plat-
forms, manned interplanetary spacecraft, communications satellites and
unmanned planetary probes. These applications can generally be divided
into on-board power requirements for communications, life support, and
data acquisition and transmission, as well as to provide the power for
electric propulsion. The estimated requirements for on-board power is
on the order of 30 to40 kilowatts, Whereas the electric power requirement
for a large electric rocket system, to propel a manned interplanetary
spacecraft, may be on the order of 20 to 30 megawatts.
At the _reset_t time there are a number of developmental programs
unde_- way which Will eventually provide the electric power and propulsion
requirements for advanced spacecraft. Amohg t_ese are the joint NASA-
AEC, SNAP-3 program and NASA's thermionic conversion system research
project.
Along with rocket propulsion and auxiliary power generators, other
modular technologies associated with the space program will advance and
their impact on the aerospace planning process will be felt. For example,
the field of space electronics--specifically computers, radar, and commu-
nications--will continue, as in the past, to grow and expand at a rapid rate.
Complex electronic equipment carried aboard spacecraft will have to be
reduced in size, weight and power requirements, while improvements of
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several orders of magnitnde in reliability, operating life and data rates will
have to be obtained; particularly as man begins flights to the distant planets.
For example, the Ranger VII spacecraft using existing communication facilo
ities was able to transmit more than 4000 good quality pictures over the
250,000 miles from the moon to the earth. :_,owever, at planetary distances
of tens or hundreds of millions of miles the information transmitting capacity
of the communications link decreases drastically. According to NASA cal-
culations, if all other factors remain constant, the capacity of a radio commu-
nication |ink decreases as the square of the transmission distance, This
means that the Mars-to-Earth data transmission capacity of the present
facilities is on the order of 1/1,000,000 of their moon-to-Earth Capacity.
Consequently, if the P_nger VII spacecraft had been flown to Mars, only a
small fragment of one picture could have been transmitted to the earth in
the time interval of approach.
In addition, _round-based communications, tracking, and command
and control equipments, which can operate for extended periods of time
over ranges of hundreds of thousands and millions of miles, will continue
to be developed and improved. This requirement to communicate over
millions of miles with distant spacecraft or manned outposts on the planets
will be matched by a requirement to communicate with intelligent beings
* Summary Report, Future Programs Taak Group, A report by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to the President, Washington, D. C.,
April 1965, p. 79.
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living beyond the range of our solar system. If suchcommunication were
possible, its ultimate effect onour society could be profound. To meet these
growing electronic requirements both DODand NASAare supporting a sig-
nificant number of electronic research projects. NASA, in particular,
through its new multi-million-dollar Electronic P,esearch Center in Cambridge,
i_assachusetts, will conduct both basic and developmental research on a
wide range of electronic systems, subsystems and components for space
applications.
The significance of this growing research effort in space electronics
to aerospace planners and decision-makers is highlighted by the fact that
the percentage of electronic hardware for space, purchased by the
government has been increasing as evidenced by the fact that in 1960, 25
percent of every doiiar spent in space teclmoiogy was for electronics_
whereas in 1965, 30 percent of every "space dollar' was spent on electronics.
As manned space flight becomes more commonplace, there will be
an increased emphasis on bio-medical technology, particularly as extended
lunar and planetary explorations are planned and later carried out. Of singular
importance will be the development of escape and survival techniques and
equipment, as well as research into the bio-medical, and psychological pro-
blems associated with manls survival in a hostile, cramped, non-terrestrial
environment, for days, weeks, and months at a time.
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Two bio-medlcal areas of primary interest for future planning pur-
poses involve research into the effects of weightlessness on the cardiovascular
and musculoskeletal systems. In addition there will be a need to develop
technologies and experiments to test the effect of the space environment
on the genetic effects of micro-organisms, as well as the physiological
responses of animals to weightlessness. There will also be a need for
further research and development of life support technology which will, for
the long duration missions, make up significant percentages of the weight
and volume of the spacecraft, since it provides all the things needed for
men to endure the hostile environment of space, i.e., food, water, air,
climate control, protective clothing and waste removal (see Fig. 5 ).
However, develb_lng sdch equipment is _i_cdlt because it is not only complex,
hut it must be lightweight, reliable, and fit into a small space.
The successful evolution of the space program also depends on ad-
vances in the critical area of materials technology. At the present time,
the lack of proper materials is a major difficulty in the development of
advanced, high-performance space systems. Currently available materials
are unable to withst_md all of the temperature, pressure, radiation, cor-
rosion and the stress conditions existing in space. However, through
materials research, particularly in the development and use of plastics,
ceramics and refractory metals, further improvements are expected.
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Eventually, by-products of thesenew materials will be employed in
non-space activities--such as home construction--where they may compete
with or displace existing materials and markets. On the other hand, space
materials, reconstituted in the form of consumer products and medical
equipment, can add to our comfort, convenience and health. *
Systems Technology
For the purpose of this report the space systems technology devel-
opments of interest to planners and decision-makers will be sub-divided into:
I) spacecraft systems; 2) launch systems, and; 3) operational support
systems with each category including, where appropriate, both NASA ahd
DOD programs, as well as manned and lmm_nned vehicles.
At the present time there are two manned and twelve unmanned
spacecraft systems managed by NASA, and several types of classified
DOD spacecraft managed by DOD, that are in operational use or are under
development at the present time. These include such unmanned vehicles
as TIROS, Ran_r, Ma_mer and VELA, as well as the mann_ syste_6t
Gemini and Apollo. This diversified family of spacecraft ]ms supplied data
on space phenomena in an area extending out from the surface of the earth
* See NASA News Release No. 63-197, Report on Commercial Use of
Space Technology, Washington, D. C., August 31, 1963.
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to planets of Mars and Venus; hascollected information or provided operationzl
support in such areas as weather forecasUng,.ocmmtmicatio_ and tmvtgatt_m;
or has beenutilized to obtain operational experience in manned orbital flight,
rendezvous and bio-medical effects.
Up to the present time these manned and unmanned spacecraft have
been launched by a family of first-generation launch vehicle systems in-
cluding Atlas, Thor, Scout and Titan H with thrusts ranging from 90,000
to 430,000 pounds and orbital payload capabilities of 250 to 8,000 pounds.
The preflight testing, launching, controlling and recovery (where
required) of these first-generation spacecraft and launch vehicles is carried
out by a large and complex network of operational and logistic support systems
ranging in size and importance from the Kennedy and Vandenberg Space
Flight Centers, through the i_ianned Spacecraft Center at Houston, to the
network of manned and unmanned mission tracking stations located through-
out the world.
In the 1966 to 1970 time period, developments in all areas of systems
technology will continue. For example, some of the existing manned and
unmanned spacecraft such as Ranger and Gemini will be phased out and
replaced by more advanced spacecraft such as Surveyor and Apollo. How-
ever, throughout 1966-1970 most of the existing unmanned spacecraft such
as TIROS, Explorer, the Observatory Series (OAO, OGO, OSO) and Mariner
will continue to be improved upon and utilized to a greater degree than is
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presently the case. In addition, between1966and 1970, spacecraft such
as Voyager, Apollo and the l_iOL, as well as new communication and bio-
satellites will emerge from development Into full operational status.
Dynamic improvements in launch vehicle systems will also take
place in the 1966-1970 time period. Such systems as Atlas and Titan II
will be phased out tO be replaced by a varied and flexible family of vehicles,
including, the Saturn I and Titan III with thrusts of 1.5 million pounds to 2.5
million pounds and earth-0i-bi_ payloads of 29,000 to 30,000 pounds. Later
in the 1966-1970 time period the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles will
reach operational status. Saatrn IB has a thrust of 1.6 million pounds and
an earth-orbit payload of 35,000 pounds; the Saturn V, which will carry the
first U. S. astronauts to the moon, will have a first-stage thrust of 7.5
million pounds and a low earth-orbit payload of more than 250,000 pounds.
As the number and variety of manned and unmanned spacecraft
launchings increases in the 1966-1970 time period, and the primary effort
of the U. S. space program focuses on the manned lunar landing, the oper-
ational support and logistics systems, such as the Manned Spacecraft Center
will be concurrently expanded and improved upon. For example, Apollo
ground support requirement studies have indicated that the present manned
spaceflight tracking network will have to be augmented through the addition
of two transportable stations as well as additional S-band equipment with
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30-foot antmmas. In addition, the plannedextension of tracking coverage
for Apollo to the lunar surface has necessitated further improvements In the
existing operational ground stations as well as In the tracking ships and
aircraft. This wlll result In a significant increase In operational support
capabilities over .that required for Gemini. *
In addition to the Apollo operaUonal support networks, expansion
has and will continue to be necessary in the deep space network during
1966-1970, This improved capability wlll include real-time, simultaneous
handling of Pioneer _ Surveyor, and the proposed Lunar Orbiter over
communication distances ranging from zs0,000 to 150 million miles. This
has resulted in a need to increase command and control capabflitles as well
as system sensitivity. In addition, three new Zl0-foot diameter and two new
85-foot diameter antenna stations are under construction or planned to pro-
vide tracking support for lunar and planetary missions.
While expansion of existing ground, sea and air-based tracking
stations, additional command-control and data processing units, as well as
large-diameter antennas and data link requirements will be required to
meet the reqttirements of the manned and unmanned space missions in the
1966-1970 time period, it will not be necessary to construct operational,
* 1966 NASA A ut.horization, Hearings before the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, Part I, Washington, D. C. w February-April
i96,5, :pp_, f91-1,05o .. • " ..
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support and logistics facilities similar to the Manned Spacecraft Center at
Houston or the Merritt Island launch complex at Cape Kennedy. However,
expansion within these facilities will take place during 1966-19"/0. However,
one additional and large launching and control facility is under consideration
at the present time. This new operational support facility, to be developed
for the MOL program, will probably be located south of the present Western
Test Range in California. *
Up to 1970, the scope and characteristics of the manned and unmanned
programs in the areas of spacecraft systems, launch vehicle systems and
operational aupport and logistics systems are essentially structured and the
funds committed. Except for the effect of such critical developments as a
Soviet lunar landing before 1969, most of the program and funding changes
that take place between now and 1970 will be relatively minor.
Beyond 1970, the specific goals and funding decisions relative to the
national space program have yet to be made. However, based upon studies
and proposals for post-1970 space goals and considering the broad and flexible
base of hardware systems and operational capabilities that have been built
up since 1958, it appears that the following post-1970 developments are
possible.
* Manned Orbiting Laboratory, Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C. _ February 1966.
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For example, in the area of manned spacecraft systems for the post-
1970 time period, the following types have been proposed: A large manned
space station based on the combined technology and operational experience
of the Gemini, Apollo and IViOL. Launohed into low-_rth or high-synchronous
orbit, the space station could have a number of missions, including, weather
observation, communications and navigation as well as oceanographic,
natural resources and bio-medical research. It could also serve as a training
and logistics support station for orbital assembly, lunar and planetary mis-
sions. The modules for the space station will probably be developed from
Apollo and MOL _e, with a supporting ea_it f_rry system
based on Gemini, Apollo or a new lifting vehicle developed from the current
M-2 or HL-10 configurations.
It is also possible, to maximize cost/effectiveness, that the space
station and the first manned planetary spacecraft will be developed from
common modules with the space station configuration serving as a realistic
training base for the later manned planetary mission. In addition, other
spacecraft may be developed in the post-1970 time period; these could in-
clude a direct earth-to-lunar surface logistics vehicle and a temporary
station on the lunar surface, both based on ApoHo-LEM hardware.
It is also possible that the late post-1970 time period will see the
development of a manned planetary vehicle for t he exploration of Mars.
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Becauseof the mission requirements in terms of propulsion, time, velocity,
fuel, and life support equipment, this vehicle could be a radically new de-
sign which, unlike other post-1970 manned systems, will incorporate a
minimum of Apollo hardware. In addition to the basic vehicle, the manned
Mars mission will require the development of advanced nuclear propulsion
modules, life support systems and long-life auxiliary power packages.
The post-1970 period could also see the development of a winged
hypersonic vehicle that would be neither aircraft nor spacecraft, but a
combination of both. This system would travel at speeds of Mach 6-8 and
have global ranges in and on the outer limits of the earth's atmosphere.
Variations of this design could be used as a reuseable first-stage booster
or an orbital transport for advanced manned missions. Since this vehicle
could be employed for a variety of non-military and military missions, in
both the earth's atmosphere and. in space, it would have a good cost/effec-
tiveness ratio,based on considerations of economics, mission versatility
and operational flexibility.
In the unmanned spacecraft area, the emphasis in the post-1970 period
will continue to be on improving existing capabilities, or developing new
capabilities, wlm_s necessary,, in #_ axe_s of application satellites, i.e.,
communications (particularly synchronous TV satellites) navigation and
weather observation; as well as exploratory vehicles such as the OAO, OGO,
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OSO series and the Pioneer, Explorer, Mariner and Voyager series. As
with manned space flight, these vehicles will be used to the maximum with
new hardware developed only where mission requirements cannot be met
with existing capabfliUes, as may be the case for fly-by missions to the
distant planets, e.g., Jupiter, or the asteroid belt.
In the manned, mfliiary spacecraft area the emphasis in the post-
1970 period should be on improving and developing the MOL system into
a larger and fully operational military space station with multi-mission
capability. It is also possible that a manned spacecraft based upon current
hypersonic lifting vehicle research (e.g., Scramiet) may be developed in the
post-1970 period, for military missions in space,
The unmanned spacecraft requirements for military space missions
in the post-1970 period will be met by synchronous communications
satellites, navigation and meteorological satellites for military forces, as
well as early warning, reconnaissance and anti-satellite systems. How-
ever, it is possible that some, if not all of these missions and functions
could be incorporated into a larger version of the MOL in the 1970's;
consequently, a need for specialized unmanned military space systems could
be substantially reduced or eliminated.
It should be emphasized, however, that specific and more detailed
definitions of military spacecraft requirements beyond this level cannot
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be made. This has been noted by Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air
Force. In a statement before a Senate Committee in 1965, Dr. Brown said:
I know that you appreciate the difficulty in precisely fore-
casting a "real world" of the 1975-85 era upon which to base
any firm space system planning factors. We recognize that
not all the space system concepts we are studying today are,
as yet, technically feasible as well as economically or oper-
atio_llly sensible. We continue to weigh potential threats in
an attempt to determine the spectrum of potential future mili-
tary needs. I like to refer to this continuing effort as the
definition of a set of building blocks for future military capa-
bility with a two-pronged emphasis--operational effectiveness
and economic realism. *
As for the post-1970 launch vehicle systems (for both manned and
unmanned missions) they will probably be off-the-shelf versions of Saturn IB,
Tital HI and Saturn V, employed to launch both DOD and NASA spacecraft
into low, and high synchronous earth and lunar orbits, as well as to the
surface of the moon, to the planets, and into deep space. Later in the
post-1970 time period _975-1980) advanced versions of Saturn I]3 and V
with high energy or nuclear upper stages will be required for high payload
earth orbital, lunar and planetary flights. In addition, a reuseable launch
system, which could evolve from current hypersonic vehicle research,
may be required for more advanced earth orbit, ferry and space rescue
missions, as well as a radically new planetary fly-by landing vehicle
* National Space Goals for Post-Apollo Period, Hearlngs before the Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C.,
August 1965, p. 314.
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which could be used to carry manned expeditions to Mars and Venus. *
This system, with an earth-orbit weight of several million pounds would
most likely be assembled in earth orbit with the individual spacecraft modules
launched into the assembly area by an advanced Saturn V.
When the launch vehicle development program reaches a point where
a single booster can place 500,000 pounds into orbit, the requirement for
large chemical booster systems will taper off. From that point on orbital
payload requirements in excess of 500,000 pounds win probably be met by
multiple latmchtngs and assembly in orbit.
DOD requirements for launch vehicles in the post-1970 time period
will probably be met by advanced versions of the Titan Ill-C, a system with
sufficient growth potential to provide the capability for delivering 30,000
to 50,000 pound payloads, both n_nned and unmanned, into space through-
out the 19701S. Any additional payload requirements for advanced military
missions could be met by multiple launchings and assembly in earth orbit,
orby the use of larger higher-thrust, solid fuel strap-on rockets, such as
the 156 inch solid engine now under development. It is also possible that
DOD may require a reusable booster for post-1970 manned and unmanned
'missions. This vehicle, possibly based on Scramjet developments, could
be used where repetitive launchings of military spacecraft are necessary.
D * NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 196.,7, Hearings before Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C.,
February-March 1966, p. 259.
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In the post-1970 time period, if the plannedevolution of mannedand
unmannedspacecraft and launchvehicles takes place, andnew programs
suchas the large manned space station, the lunar base and manned planetary
exploration, as well as an advanced MOL are initiated, si_atficant expansion
and orders-of-magnitude improvements in the existing, operational and
logistic support system area will have to take place. In addition, new
operational support systems may have to be developed to meet the advanced
mission requirements.
For example expansion of the launch _n_d test facilities at the Eastern
and Western Test Ranges may be required, or an entirely new launch facility
may have to be built on one of the mid-pacific islands, particularly if nuclear
powered launch vehicles or upper stages are developed. In addition, the
existing facilities at the Manned Spaceflight Center at Houston will have to
be expanded in size and capability particularly in the areas of command and
control, data handling and display capabilities to support extensive lunar
and planetary operations. To support the large manned space station, the
lunar base and the manned Mars expedition, significant increases in the
command-control, data handling and sensitivity capabilities of the current
deep space and manned spaceflight network will also be required. In fact
a merger of the current manned tracking and deep space networks into a
single system in the post-1970 time period is possible.
68
To handle the increased spacecraft traffic of the post-1970ts in terms
of launch, control and recovery operations, additional capabilities will be
requix_ at the Eastern and Western Test Ranges, as wen as in the tracking
and recovery stations around the world, particularly as launches and re-
coveries of both manned and _mm_nn_d vehicles increase and become more
numerous and repetitive. The conduct of space rescue logistics supply and
crew replacement operations between earth and a manned space station or
earth and a lunar base will also impose additional requirements on existing
ground-based support facilities.
The post-1970-1980 time period will probably see the development
of large-scale operational support and logistics facilities in space or on the
lunar surface. These new and unique facilities could serve as supplementary
launch, tracking, recovery and re-entry stations; as space repair and rescue
facilities, or as stage areas for major planetary and lunar operations. As
such, these space-base facfltUes would perform some of the tasks currently
carried out at the present earth-based launching, recovery and control
centers.
THE NATIONAL SPACE BUDGET
Another significant factor to consider in any aerospace planning
activity is the annual federal space budget; including the total appropriation,
the specific amounts allocated to NASA and to DOD, and the expenditures
for individual programs. In addlflcn_ to being the prime economic indicator
of this country's commitment to space exploration the national space budget
is a positive indicator of the relative "politit_" strength of those agencies
that have presented their program and dollar requirements to the Legislative
and Executive branches of government.
In a total sense, however, the federal appropriations for space tech-
nology are a reflection of: 1) U. S. national policies and objectives; 2) the
Soviet techno-mflim_ _-_eat; and 3) specific military and/or scientific
requirements. In addition to these factors, the national space budget is
molded by decisions and actions taken in Congress, the Executive Branch,
the government agencies, the scientific community and private industry.
C_ce enacted, the space budget can affect the organizational structure
of the relevant federal agencies as well as the relationships between the federal
government and pr_s.tB industry. For e_nlde, the increasing mounts of
money spent on space since 1957 have been a factor_ along with the rationls
reaction to Soviet space accomplishments, in the growth of new agencies
such as NASA, as well as in the de-emphasis or assimilation of others such
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as NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) and ABMA (Army
Ballistics Missile Agency). In addition, the fact that non-military space pro-
grams have received higher percentages of the national budget than their
mflltary counterparts, has had both direct and indirect effects upon the
organizational relationship between NASA, DOD and the Air Force. More-
over, between 1957 and 1963 the trend in government spending, from aircraft
to missiles, and then to space systems, has also changed the basic character
of the aerospace ihdUst_y_ as well as the management, personnel skills, and
product mix of specific corporations.
One such company whose growth and current organizational struc-
ture is, in part, due to variations in federal aerospace spending since 1957
is the Martin Corporation. For example, in the period between 1956 and
1960, the company de-emphasized its aircraft engineering and production
operations at Baltimore and built new missile and space system facilities
in Denver, Colorado, and Orlando, Florida, to keep pace with actual and
anticipated changes in federal spending. Later, Martin modified its organi-
zation, its management and engineering staffs, as well as its operational
policies in response to increased federal spending for space technology--by
merging with the American-Marietta Company and setting up a separate division
to provide centralized management of the company's space programs.
* For more details on the organization of, and the planning within the Martin-
Marietta Corporation, see "Corporate Horizon," Wall Street Journal, October
I0, 1961.
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Another prime example of a companythat modified its orgainzaflon
and product line in response to federal space expendl_a-_es is North American
Aviation Incortm_ted. Their rapid transition from a prime manufacturer
of military aircraft in 1957 to the top space systems contractor in the early
1960ts is evidence of this.
In addition to its effect on government-industrial organizations and
relationships, a decision to increase or decrease total federal space budgets,
or specific portions thereof, affects the planning, the direction, and, in
some cases, the very sur_ivability of specific space projects and programs.
For example, on May 25, 1961, when the late President Kennedy established
a _ational goal to place men on the moon before 1970_ the fiscal and legis-
lative machinery of the U. S. government was set in motion, a supplemental
appropriation of $549 million was added to our space effort, and a re-
examination of NASA's man-in-space program was initiated. Subsequently,
the time schedules, budget priorities, and the management of such projects
as Gemini, Apollo, and Saturn were significantly modified. *
Later, on December 10, 1963, the DO]) decision to cancel the multi-
million dollar Dymsoar project and the related funds, not only had a direct
economic effect on the prime contractor, Boeing, but on several hundred
associated companies. Subsequently, a new DOD project, the Manned
* Some of the program changes initiated after President Kennedy's speech of
May 25, 1961, are detailed in 1962 NASA Authorization, Hearings before the
House Committee on Science and Astro,_autics, Part 3, July 1961, pp. 1036-
1060,
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Orbital Laboratory (i_OL), was initiated and additional emphasis placed
on an accelerated Gemini project; but different funds, organizations and
companies, than those associated with Dynasear, were now involved.
An examimtten of the history of the federal space budget illustrates
its significance in terms of total dollars appropriated. For example, in
1957-- the first years of the space age--only $179 million was appropriated
for all space programs. In 1958, following the launching of the Soviet Sputaiks,
the total national space budget was increased to $348 million; in 1960 it ex-
ceeded $1 billion; and by 1962, the total federal appropriations for space
had risen to approximately $3.3 billion, whereas Congress approved
a total of $5.5 billion for various federal space programs in 1963. Since
1963, the national space budget has risen to its present level of $7 billion,
(Fig. 7).
It is significant that of the total amounts appropriated for space in
the 1958 through 1966 time period, NASA's share increased from $117 million
or 34 per cent of the total federal space budget, to approximately $5.2 billion
or 74 per cent of the FSB. In the same time period, the DOD portion of the
federal space budget also increased from approximately $206 million to
$1.7 billion. However, on a percentage-of-total basisD the DOD space
appropriations decreased during the 1958-1966 time period from 60 to 24
per cent of the FSBo *
* See NASA Authorizations for Fiscal Years 1960 through 1967 Eight Reports
to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington D. C.
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As for future budgetary levels it is possible that a variety of factors,
including domestic issues, a further escalation of the war in Vietnam, or a
shift in federal spending to other national problem areas such as transportation
and water pollution will keep the national space budget at a $7-billion level or
even reduce it somewhat. Other factors of interest to aerospace planners
and decision-makers may tend to keep the space budget for 1967-1970 at
current levels. Some of these factors are directly related to the inherent
operational and technical characteristics of the space program itself. For
example, the 1957-1965 period was characterized by a race to catch up with
or match the Soviet Union in space accomplishments. Consequently, boosters,
spacecraft and launch flLciiities had to be built, government agencies had to
be created or consolidated, new industrial enterprises developed, test and
support facilities expanded or constructed, and thousands of scientists,
engineers and technicians recruited, transferred and moved from one locality
to another. As a consequence the federal expenditures for space between
1957 and the present rose at a geometric rate.
However, there are strong indications that the period of rapid and
concurrent building of a varied technological and operational base is leveling
off and the space program is entering a period where the requirement will
be for reliable and repetitive launchings of existing boosters and spacecraft,
and the maximum use of current launch, control and recovery facilities as
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well as on-the-shelf hardware that can now be used for a multiplicity of
purposes rather than a single, one shot purpose. As a consequence, the
period between now and 1970 may be characterized by a more efficient and
less costly use of space resources.
In addition, federal space budgets could remain at current levels
through 1970 as a result of a continuation and possible further escalation
of the Vietnamese war, a factor that space-age managers in government
and industry will have to take into consideration in their planning activities.
If the war continues and the U. S. commitment increases significantly,
federal space spending will very likely remain at the current $7 billion
level, or may even be reduced. There are indications, for example, that
the MOL program funding and schedule have been affected by the war in
Vietnam.
Finally, federal space budgets may hold at current levels owing to
increased government spending on other critical national problems such as
transportation and water pollution. These budgetary actions may be
promoted not only by the critical nature of these "new" problems, but as a
result of the widespread use of the new federal Planning-Programming-
Budgeting System, which will be employed as a decision-making device by
the President to compare the space program requirements and budget with
such things as the national transportation, education, housing and defense
requirements. With such across the board comparisons of major national
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programs, it is possible that money and effort intended for space research
will go elsewhere.
However, there are a number of developments which could take place
between 1966 and 1970 which could result in an increase in the total annual
space budgets, above the current $7 billion level. * For example, it is very
possible that a continuing series of Soviet space *'spectaculars", such as a
manned cislunar flight, the construction of a space station in earth orbit
or a lunar landing (all of which are technologically possible before 1970),
could result in demands to step up and/or supplement the current space
programs and thus lead to further incgeases in annual Sl_Ve appropriations
above the $7 billion level. This would certainly occur if Congress approved
one or more of the proposed post-Apollo programs, i.e., the lunar base,
the manned space station or manned planetary exploration.
While it is possible that the rising cost of the Vietnamese war as
well as the need to solve other pressing domestic problems may cause shifts
in federal spending away from space research, it is equally possible that
the war effort may level off or peace negotiations could be initiated before
1970; consequently, some of the public and private resources currently
supporting the war effort would be available for additional space research.
* For a discussion of federal space expenditures and some of the factors
that do or could influence federal space expenditures, see Leavitt, William,
"Speaking of Space," Air Force and Space Digest, April 1966.
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Moreover, while increased federal spending in other domestic problem
areas such as transportation, urban planning and water polution will
place between 1966 and 1970, there appears to be no critical economic
reasons (assuming continued growth of the GNP) that current space budget
levels could not be increased. (See Figs, 7 and 8).
Other f_ctors which could push the federal appropriations for space
above $7 billion in the pest-1965 time period are the technical and economic
unknowns in our own space program. For example, there has been a tendency
in this country to underestimate the final costs of missile and space pro-
grams, particularly when the increased costs are a result of new techno-
logical developments or management difficulties that often emerge down-
stream in any complex project. To illustrate, the initial estimate of the
cost of the Vanguard projec_ was $20 to $30 million; however, before it
was complete, Vanguard cost over $100 million. Another example of cost
over-runs is found in Project Mercury. The cost of this program was orig-
inally estimated at $200 million; the final cost was over $400 million. Also,
there is evidence that technical and management difficulties in the Centaur
and Gemini programs have resulted in higher-than-anticipated program
costs. * Some of these increased expenditures result from management
problems or changes in program priorities and schedules, while other
* See Centaur Lv.tmch Vehicle Development Program, House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, July 1962, p. 11.
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increased costs are a result of our attempts to quickly match Soviet space
accomplishments, or unforseen, but costly technical mod_tions down-
stream in a given program.
All of th_ evidence we have to date indicates that similar factors
will probably continue to increase the federal space budget above present
levels throughout the 1966-1970 time period; in spite of strong efforts by
NASA p DOD and industry to keep such costs from rising.
Finally, another development which could lead to increased federal
spending for space is the appearance of a distinct military space _t.
This would lead to supplementary expenditures for a series of manned
military vehicles based on Gemini, MOL and/or Apello, which in turn
would lead to new requirements and increased expenditures for ground
installations, including command and control systems. *
Therefore, on the basis of evolving and currently unforeseen pro-
gram requirements, coupled with the effect of the Soviet space developments
and/or military threats, it is possible that the total federal spaoe budget
could rise from the current $7 billion plateau to as much as $13 billion
by 1970. This budgetary increase is certain to occur if we get firm evidence
that the Russians _re going to beat us to the moon°
i
• See Missiles and Rockets, Vol. II (1962), p. 32 for statement on aero-
space command and control requirements by General Charles H. Terhune,
former Commander, Air Force Electronic Systems Division, AFSC.
.SPACE MANPOWER AND FACILITY RESOURCES
Manpower and facilities, coupled to the available monies, are the
primary resources employed to carry out the national space program, and
consequently are an important consideration in any space-age planning and
decision-making activity. As was noted previously, the current U. S. space
effort employs close to 500 thousand people * and involves ten major govern-
ment agencies, approximately 100 large corporations, several thousand
medium and small companies, and roughly 200 universities and non-profit
fustltutes.
In many ways the manpower and facilities employed in the space effort
are unique in the sense that in their impact on our national life, as well as
in their skills and design they are unlike those found in the automobile,
steel and chemical industries. Some of the unique characteristics of the
manpower utilized in the space program, were noted in a book prepared by
the editors of Fortune Magazine. They stated:
The space effort is the first para-mflitary effort in history
not accompanied by a demand for heavy hardware and mass-
produced materials, Its great demand, instead, is for pro-
fesstonal people and it may relatively soon employ up to a
million. Since more and more money will go into manpower,
particularly engineers and other technical specialists, the
• i n
Estimate includes industrial, government, and university personnel.
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coordinating their space planning, budgeting and program management
activities. On the whole, these working arrangements, which have slowly
and painfully evolved, have reduced much of the duplication and overlap
between our military and non-raillery space activities and have improved
the overall management and organi_tion of our national space program
since it was first initiated in 1958.
At the onset of the space age, the United States did not have an
organized space program. Up to that time the federal government bad
been supporting a number of independent research projects with little or
no inter-project coordination or management control.
After Sputnik I, the U. S; SliCe program began to gather momentum
and the need for closer coordination and administrative control became more
apparent. In an attempt to meet this requirement, the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (ARPA) was established within the Department
of Defense and given the prime responsibility for managing the various U. S.
space programs, as well as the development of advanced weapons. * This
was the first and only time that the national space effort was administered
by a single agency, By the end of 1957, however, the U. S. reaction to
*Department of Defense News Release, No. 109-58, DOD, Office of Public
Information, Washington, D. C., February 7, 1958.
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Slm/n/k I had reached the crisis level and there were demands made and
proposals put forth to restructure the nationts space effort to meet the Soviet
clmllenge. Consequently, on October 1, 1958, another and major reorga-
nizaUon took place; the responsibility for the peaceful, non-mfli/m'y aspects
of our space program was officially given to the National Aero_tuflcs and
Space Administration, and such projects as Mercury, Vangtmrd, meteoro-
logical and communication satellites, and lunar probes--includlng some
of the related funds and personnel--were gradually transferred from ARPA
to the new agency. However, ARPA, in concert with the Air Force, Navy
and Army, cont/mzed to manage military reconnaissance, navigation and
ecmmun/cation eatellit8 projects.
81nee ARPA and NASA were relatively new a_encies, and because
they were trying to manage a dynamic and complex iechnology, it was not
possible for either agency to clearly deltmmte its responoibfl/tiest misatens,
and program requirements--or to define areas for cooperation and ooor-
dinaflon. As a consequence, inter-a_ency conflicts arose over program
management, budgets, missions, and technical requirements. *
* For a more detailed discussion of the organizational problems in the
space program, see: Govemmen_ Organization for Space Activities,
Senate Comm/ttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C.,
August 25, 1959, and Orgzuzb_ation and Management of Miesfle Programs,
Report of the House Committee on Government Operations, Wash/ngton,
D. C., September 2, 1959.
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OnSeptember 18, 1959, the Department of Defensecarried out
another reorganization of its space program; ARPA conthmedto be re-
sponsible for missile defenseand other special research projects, but
its prime role in space was downgraded. For e_tmple, ARPA turned over
responsibility for certain military satellites to the Air Force; Project
Transit went to the Navy; and Project Notus, i.e., Advent, became the
Army's responsibility. * Rather than improving inter-agency coordi-
nation, a further deterioration in space program management and control
resulted as each agency attempted to establish its own space effort. This
situation continued until January 1961, when, after several months of study,
the Ad Hoc Committee on Space, a group appointzd by then President-elect
Kennedy and headed by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, found that under the current
management concept, "each of the military services has begun to create
its own independent space program. This presents the problem of over-
la_ programs and duplication of the work of NASA." Therefore, the
Wiesner Committee recommended that the President should: "establish
a single responsibility within the military establishments for managing the
military portion of the space program". **
ii i
• The military communications satellite program is currently a Defense
Communication Agency responsibility, with Army, Navy and Air Force
participation.
• * Defense Space Interests, Hearings before the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, Washington, D. C., March 1961, p. 19 & 93.
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This report was followed on March 6, 1961, by a DOE) directive
from Defense Secretary McNamara which stated:
Each of the mflltary services is authorized to conduct
preliminary research to develop new ways of using space
technology to perform its assigned function within the
limitations to be fixed by the Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering. When these studies result in
proposals for research and development projects, the
military services will submit the proposals for research
and development to the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering who will recommend to the Secretary
those proposals which he believes should he developed.
Upon approval of the project by the Secretary of Defense,
the management of further research and development
of the project will become the responslbflity of the
Department of the Air Force, unless in the opinion
of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense,
unusual circumstances justify assignment of the
particular project to another Service. *
To a degree, the iVicNamara directive enhanced the status and
responsibfllty of the Air Force, as DOD's "space agent"; however, the
overall declsion-maklng responsibility, and budgetary control for mili-
tary space programs, remained with the Department of Defense. More-
over, the directive triggered a series of executive actions, or_tzatiomd
re-alignments, and program changes which brought the National Aermmutics
and Space Administration and the Department of Defense into very close
agreement on national space policy, and led to improvements in both
NASA and DOD planning, budgeting and staffing, and in overall z_snage-
ment of the separate, as well as joint U. S. space efforts.
* Department of Defense News P_lease, No. 196-61, DOD, O_ice of Public
Affairs, Washington, D. C., March 8, 1961.
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The next major reorganization of the national spaceprogram occurred
in the summer and fall of 1961t after the flight of Yuri Gagarin in Vostok I
and following President Kennedy's speech to Congress on Urgent National
Needs. This time, most of the reorganizational activity centered on the
NaUonal Aeronautics and Space Administration.* In the main, this involved
the creation, within NASA, of an Office of i_nned Space Flight, the estab-
lishment of a Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas, and a central-
izaflon of the lunar landing program under a single director. In turn, these
organizational changes within NASA bad immediate and long-term impacts
on both government and industrial managers, in particular, on the decisions
they bad to make to bring their respective organizations into phase with the
new NASA program structure.
In addition to the changes in NASA's organizational :structaro, the
National Aeronautics _ Space Council, Presidential advisory group, and the
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board established joint NASA-
DOD guidelines for the development and utilization of launch vehicles,
spacecraft, ground instrumentation and facilities, as well as the conduct
of research in specialized technological areas. Later, DOD and NASA agreed
to exchange and coordinate their five year plans for budget, technology and
scheduling concurrence, and adopted a common PERT/Cost program.
a,,
* See Figure 9 for pre-1961 NASA organization.
** See Systems Development ahd Management, Part 5, Hearings before _e
House Committee on Government Operations, Washington, D. C., August
1962, p. 1926-1949.
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To further consolidate and strengthen the nation's space effort,
NASA and the Department of Defense, operating through DOD's agent, the
Air Force System Command, established in May and June 1962, a manage-
ment group at NASA Headquarters to coordinate the manned space flight
program. A few months later, on November 22t 1962, NASA announced
the appointment of Admiral Walter F. Boone (Retired) to tlm newly created
post of Deputy Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs. NASA said
Boone's job would be to strengthen the flow of technical and management
information between NASA and the Department of Defense.
Late in 1963, NASA went through another major reorganization. As
described in a report by the House Committee on Government Operations,
this involved the program offices' returning to the status of line agencies,
with the different field centers and installations reporting directly to them
instead of to top management. * At the same time the program office direc-
tors were elevated to Associate Administrators. Reporting to the Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight were the Marshall Space Flight Center
at Huntsville, Alabama; the Manned Spaceoraft Center at Houston, Texas;
and the Launch Operations Center in Florida. The Office of Space Sciences
and the Office of Applications were merged into one, and reporting to the
new Associate Adminlstrator for Space Science and Applications were the
* Govt. Operations in Space , p. 75.
/
/
/
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Godds_l Space Flight Center in Maryland_ the Pacific Launch Operations
Office in California, the Wallops Station in Virginia, and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory in California. Advanced research and technology also was placed
in the charge of an Associate Administrator, supervising the old NACA research
centers of Ames, Langleyt Lewis, and Edwards.
This re-alignment of the various centers responded to a growing em-
phesis on specific project management. For example, under the new ar-
e
rangement the Marshall Center would concentrate primarily on the devel-
opment of the Saturn family of launch vehicles, whereas the Manned
Spacecraft Center in Houston would concentrate on capsule development
and astronaut training for the Gemini and Apollo programs. The Goddard
Center, however, would not only en_age in applications development, but
also manage the work directed by the separate Office of Tracking and Data
Acquisition. Nevertheless, while some overlap still existed between centers
and center activities, the new arrangement "contributed to the unification
of resources and activities needed to achieve success on particular projects."
These organizational changes did not diminish the authority of NASA's
top management: in fact, under the 1963 reorganization, the overall manage-
ment staffing at NASA headquarters was strengthened, specifically in the
adminlst_tive areas of programming_ budgeting, policy planning, liaison_
and contracting.
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As with Nasa, the Department of Defense had similar management
problems that came to the surface in 1962-1963. In DOD's case t however,
the issues involved not only project management but the question of the
mllitaryls role in space. FurthermoreD the high costs and management
difficulties involved in developing new technologies, as well as the problem
of costly duplication between NASA and DOD space projects were also
involved.
As noted in a recent Congressional Report, "The competition with
NASA had become a bedeviling problem for the Defense Department by 1963,
particularly where the area of manned space was involved. It was over the
question of the mfll_ry role of man in space that the (Defense) Secretary
and the Air Force were sharply divided. Faced with the probable cancel-
lation of Dynasoar, the Air Force was seriously concerned that there would
be no such role. The concern was heightened by the equally dim prospects
for future manned bombers now that the B-70 project had been cut back and
the Skybolt cancelled in late 1962. Moreovert reliance on missiles also
reduced the manned role 0 and in the area of ballistic missiles, develop-
ment was coming to a close.
"This concern of the Air Force was not restricted to doctrinal ab-
stractions about the role of military man in space nor to the problem of a
diminishing workload and r_source base. Air Force planue_.s sori_J31y
9O
considered that manned space flight held out important military promise,
not only to counter Soviet developments an_ potentially hostile spacecrafts,
but also to en_Jace certain existing military missions, such as reconnais-
sance, intelligence, command and control, electronics countermeasures,
detection, and bombardment.
from the mission of Dynasoar.
The job of bombardment had been witlidrawn
Ouestioning the feasibility of an orbital or
other space bombardment system as compared with missiles and desirous
of avoiding an arms race in space, the Administration announced that the
United States did not intend to orbit weapons of mass destruction in space.
Later statements of the same l_ind by the Soviets finally resulted in a mutual
policy position, given international recognition in the United Nations." *
"The Air Force, however, was unwilling to rely completely on NASA,
itecognizing that NASA's efforts would contribute to needed basic technology,
the Air Force still did not believe that certain techniques of systems would
be developed by NASA. Consequently, the Air Force submitted a number of
manned space projects to the top review levels of the Department through-
out 1962 and 1963. All of these plans, manned orbital development system
(MODS), Blue Gemini and the like, were returned to the Air Force for more
analysis and definition. Defense officials sympathized with Air Force concern
but under the prevailing policies of restraint in space work, cost-effectiveness,
and precise program and requirements definition, the specific proposals did
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1884 (SVIII), Oct. 17, 1963.
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not survive." * At this point in time, the Department of Defense began to
loot_ to NASA for manned space efforts and both agencies initiated cooperative
agreements for the management of specific space programs.
For example_ on January 21, 1963, NASA and DOD signed an
agreement to Jointly participate in NASA' s Gemini project, and a Gemini
Program Planning Board was formed. This action gave official recognition
to the decision to rely on Gemini rendezvous and docking experiments for
satellite inspection applications, rather than proceeding with development
of DOD's Saint project.
DODts reliance on NASA for manned space flight operations and
experience continued until December 109 1963, when Secretary of Defense
McNamara, after announcing that Dynascar would be cancelled, stated that
a new manned orbiting laboratory (I_IOL) program would be initiated and
managed by the Air Force. With this announcement the Defense Secretary
appeared to be emphasizing two points: 1) that DOD would no longer rely
entirely on NASA for manned space flight experience and applications, and
2) that, contrary to previous DOD policy, there appeared to be a valid re-
quirement for manned military operations in space. Furthermore0 the
MOL decision appeared to be counter to previous NASA-DOD agreements
on manned space flights and duplicated NASA plans for manned space
stations.
-B
* Govt. Operations in S_ace, pp. 80-81.
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The apparent overlap of DODand NASA space station plans and
programs created new demands for coordination from Congress which
were met, to a degree, by a joint NASA-DOD agreement to exchange in-
formation relative to MOL and other manned space flight experiments.
However _ NASA went ahead with its own plans to study the requirements
for a manned space station based on Apollo hardware. However, to min-
imize future conflicts and duplication between NASA and DOD manned space
flight activities_ and the l_iOL and Apollo space station programs in partic-
ular, the Joint Manned Space Flight Committee was established in January
1966. It is the purpose of this committee to reView the total manned space
flight effort of both agencies including NASAVs Gemini and Apollo programs
and DODVs Manned Orbiting Laboratory, *
In spite of some conflict and overlap, as illustrated by the MOL and
Apollo space station programs, it appears that NASA and tl_ Department
of Defense will continue to view U. S. policies and objectives through the
same pair of glasses. This will be reflected in a strengthening of the close
working relationships between the two agencies; their utilization of inter-
agency planning and study groups--such as the Aeronautics and Astronau-
tics Coordinating Board B the Gemini Joint Planning Board and the Joint
Manned Space Flight Committee--to resolve organizational, technical and
* NASA Authorization for Fisca ! Year 1967, p. 51.
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budgetary conflicts; and their joint management of, or cooperation on, certain
projects, such as the X-15, Gemini, MOL and ApoHo. Furthermore, while
a merger of NASA and DOO space activities under a new supra-agency is
possible, the probability of such a move will be low, as long as U. S. policy
emphasizes the peaceful exploration of space. However, if the Soviet Union
were to develop and orbit a series of offensive and/or defensive space weapons,
which could be clearly identified as such, the probability of a NASA-DOD
merger under a new natlenai space agencyj would be very high. However, in
the future it is possible that DOD and NASA will plan for and obtain funds
from the same program package, as is indicated by the initiation of the
new federal Planning-Programming-Budgeting System.* "_nile this may bring
NASA and DOD into even closer cooperation, nevertheless, the essence of
separate military and non-military space organizations will probably be
retained.
As for future cooperation on the project management level, DOD and
NAsANfollowing the precedent set by such programs as the X-15, Mercury
and Gemini--will probably cooperate on the development of the large manned
space station as well as the hypersonic research aircraft, a vehicle with the
capability to take off from a conventional airfield, go into orbit, re-enter
and land like an aircraft. Another project of major size and importance,
,
See, Bulletin No. 66-3, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, October 12, 1965.
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which in all probability, will be jointly managed by NASA and DOD, is the
construction of a lunar base; since both agencies have funded lunar basing
studies in the past. For example, NASA initiated a study contract with the
Army Corps of Engineers to define the requirements for a lunar base devel-
opment program in 1963, and since 1957 the Air Force has funded a series
of studies aimed at defining, in great detail, the requirements for constructing
scientific and military facilities on the lunar surface.
Owing to the size and complexity of the lunar project, the resources
required, and the multimission capabilities inherent in a lunar base, a closely
coordinated management effort by DOD and NASA may be required. Or, it
may be necessary to establish a new and autonomous agency to manage the
project.
While NASA and DOD will continue to jointly administer and coordinate
their efforts on certain common purpose programs, there are missions, re-
quirements and programs that exist now, or will exist in the future, within
each agency's area of responsibility, which will remain the separate respon-
sibility of that particular agency. Consequently, there will be no specific
need to enter into joint management relationships. This is particularly true
where either NASA or DOD have a clear-cut mission requirement which is
not directly associated with, or does not overlap a mission requirement of
the other organization.
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For e_mple, DO, is solely responsible for the military reconnais-
sanceand the spacedefensemissions. The Department of Defensewill also
be directly involved where there are other specific military missions to per-
form in space, e.g., early warning, or where there is a need for quick
reaction, positive and secure control, and high systems survivability. On
the other hand, any space system such as Mariner, Voyager and the Orbiting
Astronamical Observatory (OAO) designed to meet a specific non-military
mission, e.g., lunar or planetary exploration, solar research, etc., will
be managed and developed entirely by NASA.
In summary, it can be stated that the management and organizational
changes that have taken place in DOD and NASA relative to the national space
program have had both positive and negative effects on the management
planning and decision-making process in government and industry. These
management changes and their impact were more frequent and pronounced
in the period between 1957 and 1963 when this country was essentially re-
acting to a Soviet challenge and at the same time attempting to manage a
costly and explosive technology, where the missions, requirements and
agency responsibilities were not clearly defined. This situation was re:
flected in the management decisions and actions within the aerospace industry
which frequently went off on many unpromising tangents during the early
days of the space program, in an attempt to develop and/or produce space
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system concepts and hardware to meet fll defined missions and requirements.
However, since 1963, the management and organizational aspects of the
national space program have been refined and improved upon to the extent
that the management responsibilities of NASA and DOD are more specifically
outlined; space missions and requirements more clearly stated; cooperative
arrangements for the management of joint space projects have been defined
and utilized; and aerospace planners and decision makers in both industry
and government have the financial, and experience base to manage existing
or plan for new projects. While new organizational and management structures
may be needed as the space program continues, these changes will not be as
dramatic or as frequent as in the past when a firm mission, requirements,
data and experience base did not exist.
SPACE MANPOWER AND FACILITY RESOURCES
Manpower and facilities, coupled to the available monies, are the
primary resources employed to carry out the national space program, and
consequently are an important consideration in any space-age planning and
decision-making activity. As was noted previously, the current U. S, space
effort employs close to 500 thousandpeopte* and involves ten major govern-
ment agencies, approximateiy 100 large corporations, several taous___d
medium and Small companies, and roughly 200 universities and non-profit
institutes.
In many ways the manpower and facilities employed in the space effort
are unique in the sense that in their impact on our national life, as well as
in their skills and design they are unlike those found in the automobile,
steel and chemical industries. Some c_ the unique characteristics of the
manpower utilized in the space program, were noted in a book prepared by
the editors of Fortune Magazine. ** They stated:
The space effort is the first para-military effort in history
not accompanied by a demand for heavy hardware and mass-
produced materials. Its great demand, instead, is for pro-
fessional people and it may relatively soon employ up to a
million. Since more and more money will go into manpower,
particularly engineers and other technical specialists, the
* Estimate includes industrial, government, and university personnel.
** "The Space Industry', by the editors of Fortune Magazine, Prentice-
HaLl, Inc., New Jersey, 1962, p. 90.
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well-worn questions of whether the U.S. is producing
enough professionals is no longer academic. By 1970,
fl_mks in large part to the space venture, the U. S.
will need more than two million scientists and eugi-
neers, or about double the number employed in 1959. *
The effect of larger numbers of scientific and technical personnel
entering the space program is shown in the organizational structure of cer-
tain space related industries, where the research and development staff
outnumbers the production staff. Moreover, there are industrial and
government organizations, such as NASA s Bellcomm and Comsat, where
the entire work force is employed in space research.
The growing numbers of scientists and technicians going into the
aerospace industry is also one of the factors ** responsible for upsetting
the industryts traditional four-to-one ratio of production to non-production
workers. For example, in 1954, hourly production workers comprised
72 percent of the aerospace industryls work force, By 1959, only 50 per
cent were production workers. At the present time, aerospace production
workers represent roughly 40 per cent of the industry total, whereas pre-
dictions indicate it will decrease to approximately 30 percent by 1970. ***
* The Space Industry, by the editors of Fortune Magazine (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall_ Inc., 1962), p. 90.
** The other factors are: increased automation and the shift in the aero-
space industry away from mass production to limited production°
*** Aerospace Facts and Figures 1962, (Washington: Aerospace Industries
Association of America 1962), p. 61-66.
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While the demandfor production workers goes down, the space age
requirements for new scientific and technical skills will go up, particularly
in the fields of astrophysics, astronomy, bio-medicine, materials engi-
neering and chemistry.
These manpower trends are largely borne out by Figure 10, which
shows the changing situation in a typical aerospace company. Another
indication of the changing manpower situation is the changes in the diversi-
fication of college degrees in the aerospace industry. For example, in
1943s the degrees of professional employees at North American Aviation
Inc., a major aerospace company, were concentrated in the following
fields:
lViechanical Engineering
Chemical _ngineering
Aeronautical Engineering
Civil _ngincering
Physics
Metallurgy
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However, by 1963, the typical degrees covered more than 17___5
different disciplines including:
Actuarlal. Science
Anthropology
Archttectuze
Astronomy
Astrophysics
Bacteriology
B_
Biochemlstry
Ceramics
Electronics
Cytology
Gemology
Geophysics
Library Science
Marine Engineering
Medicine
Metallurgy
M_ E_neer_g
Nuclear Physics
Nuclear Engineering
Optics
Osieol_athy
Phosphate Science
Photogrammetry
Physical Chemistry
Pomology
Psychology
S_ciology
Tool Engineering
Traffic Management
Zoology
Meteorology
Microbiology
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Even a cursory examination of the 1943 and 1963 list of disciplines
at North American indicates the dynamic changes that have taken place in
the manpower levels and skills as well as the facilities requirements of the
aerospace industry in a twenty-year period. Moreover, it is an indication
of the many challenges facing the aerospace planner and decision-maker,
who must not only acquire training and utilize this highly diversified group
of specialists, but must have some understanding of the evolutionary trends
in space research that made the acquisition of these specialists necessary
in the first place. (see Fig. 11)
Since the demand for these highly skilled and diversified personnel
will exceed the supply, the requirement will be partially met by retaining
and increasing the workloads of currently employed engineers and scientists.
In addition to their effect on the structure and skill ratios of line
and production organizations, an increasing number of scientists and engi-
neers entering space industry are being placed in management, advisory,
or decision-making positions_or are being asked to assist or advise on
major policy decisions of the U. _ government. For example, it was the
space program, coupled to the rising importance of the scientist and engineer,
which resulted in the creation, under President Eisenhower, of the Office
of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the
appointment of Dr. James KiUian to the new post. The activity was
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continued in the Kennedy administration through the appointment of Dr.
Jerome Wiesner, and in the Johnson administration with the appointment
of _r. Donald Hornig.
In addition, special groups made up of noted scientists and eugineers--
some not necessarily associated with the space program--advise Congress,
the military services and NASA, as well as large industrial organizations. *
While many of these groups were initiated prior to the advent of the space
age_ nevertheless, they increased in number and importance after Slmthik t.
The entrance of scientists and engineers into management decision-
making and policy positions in government and industry has raised questions
about the role of the scientist and engineer as a policy maker, advisor and
decision-maker; namely: Is the scientist capable of operating effectively
in areas where political, economic and social, not scientific considerations
are paramount? To what extent and in what ways are scientific advisors
employed in reaching national policy decisions ?
While it is not possible to find quick and simple answers to these
and related questions, the growing numbers of scientists and engineers
entering the space industry, their rising importance in government and
industry, coupled with the lessening demand for production workers, are
as significant a facet of space program management as are launch
* Examples of such scientific and advisory groups are the Air Force's
Scientific Advisory Board, The Panel of Science and Technology of the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics; and in industry, the Tech-
nical Advisory Board of the Aerojet-General Corporation.
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vehicles, spacecraft and dollars. For these reasons, these human re-
sources, their diversity, utilization and growth should be considered as
a significant input to any planning exercise directly associated with the
national space program.
A recent development in the basic character of the space program
emphasizes this point. For example, a significant percentage of the
400,000 to 500,000 people employed in space research have been working
on the design, development and testing of the current family of launch
vehicles and spacecraft, such as the Saturn, Titan, and Apollo. These
systems are now, or soon will be, operational and while some of the engi-
neers and technicans working on these programs will continue to be em-
ployed throughout the program's life cycle, a certain percentage of them
will face unemployment or will be giwn tasks not consistent with their
skills; particularly, as the initial development phase of these projects is com-
pleted. Consequently, as the design, engineering, development and pre-
liminary test phases of the current space projects, such as Gemini are
completed, it will be necessary, unless these professional skills are to
be lost or diverted, for the top policy makers and planners to make the
necessary decisions to undertake some of the proposed second or third
generation space programs.
This "decision gap" and the associated manpower problems were
highlighted by NASA Administrator James Webb and Associate Administrator
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Dr. George Mueller in testimony on post-Apollo goals before the Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. * In their testimony, both
Mr. Webb and Dr. Mueller cited the impact and problems associated with
space program pl_nnin_ and decision-makfug on the 400,000 space workers
employed on NASA programs. In his testimony Mr. Webb stated:
I think these very highly qualified engineers and scientists
in American industry are going to be pretty deeply concerned
that the very success of their efforts cause them to be looking
for new jobs in other fields before we are ready to move for-
ward with the next step. Certainly, I think all of those in
industry and in the government would be very much encour-
aged if we could make the decision to utilize, as the chair-
man has indicated, the present equipment, and to extemt
its life, and to provide these scientists and engineers with
continued work in this field. All of this equipment can be
upgraded for more advanced work and for work we need to
do. But it must be upgraded by these people because the
work is very specialized. Unfortunately, however, this
comes at a time when we have other very large national
requirements on the budget. So we havz a national pro-
blem here. We do not assert the space need as against
all other needs, but nevertheless we must state this
need to the President and I believe to you.
To a degree, the total numbers of personnel employed, as well as
the changing manpower and skill ratios of the space age are directly re-
lated to the clmnges that have been taking place in aerospace facilities
and equipment requirements. These, in turn, have been affected by the
* National Space Goals for the post-Apollo Period; Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C.,
August 1965, pp. 17-22.
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evolution of technology, national policy and federal expenditures over the
past twenty years. The present aerospace industry, for example, is essen-
tiaUy an outgrowth of the aircraft and electronic industries which grew
during World War H. During that period the requirements of military strat-
egy, the limitations in technology and the emphasis on non-nuclear weaponry
created demands for hundreds of thoudands of aircraft and electronic com-
ponents which could only be met by traditional mass production methods,
with its emphasis on large plants and tens of thousands of workers.
After World War II and the Korean War, nuclear weaponry, high
performance jet aircraft and ballistic missflest as well as the "new look"
in military strategy changed the character of the aircraft and electronics
industry. Large numbers of aircraft and missiles were no longer required.
Consequently, mass production facilities and machine tools were not
needed. Moreover, the aircraft, missile, and electronics systems of the
nuclear age were not only built in fewer numbers but were considerably
more complex. This led to a reduced demand for large numbers of pro-
duction workers on one band, but an increased demand for skilled tech-
nicians, engineers, and scientists on the other. Furthermore, while the
complex aircraft, missiles and spacecraft of the 1955-1960 time period
needed less production floor space than was required in World War II,
their complexity and operatioml characteristics created demands for
C:
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sophisticated research and test facilities that were unheard of in the 1940's.
Consequently, the aerospace industry and the federal government were
faced with a somewhat paradoxical problem, namely, what to do with the
surplus mass production facilities, machine tools and workers inherited
from World "J_ar II, and yet build the new and unique facilities and obtain
the skilled craftsmen required to develop, produce and test the high per-
formance jet aircraft, missiles and space vehicles of the 1960*s. In some
cases, companies were caught in the unusual position of reducing their
facilities and labor force in one geographic area, while constructing a new
plant and recruiting employees in ahother section of the comitry.
The problem of how to dispose of, or reduce, the excess production
facilities and machine tools inherited from World War II and the Korean
War period still plagues the federal government and the aerospace industry.
In some cases, the remedy has been modification, consolidation, or sale
of excess facilities, or scrapping of obsolete tools and equipment. This,
along with the construction of new space age facilities (in most cases
away from the area of the home plant) has created economic, social, and
political problems near the home plant, as well as in the area where the
new facility is located.
* For a detailed analysis of the changes that have taken place in the
aircraft industry, see M. J. Peck and F. M. Scherer, The Weapons
Acquisition Process, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 1962.
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The facility and equipment problems generated by the space age
are still evolving. Launch vehicles and spacecraft increased so rapidly
in performancei size and complexity in the past five years that plants and
tools become obsolescent more rapidly. Moreover, the trend away from
extensiVe to selective hardware production in the aerospace industry
continues. These factors, plus the emphasis on research and development
will generate requirements for new and costly research laboratories and
design facilities. For example_ much of the present emphasis is on devel-
oping those facilities and devices which will provide realistic conditions
for studying radiation effects, vibration, acceleration, intense light, pres-
sure and temperature. In addition, there will be requirements for testing
human reactions and man-machine systems under various accelerations
and decelerations, as well as high-speed particle accelerators, adapted
to simulate radiation effects, and devices to simulate weightlessness.
Again, North American Aviation, Inc., serves as a case in point. In
1947, North American Aviation had only 82,000 square feet of floor space
devoted to research and development activities. * This included the fol-
lowing types of laboratories:
Chemistry
Structures
Electrical
Metallurgical
l_Zaterials
Engine run-up
* Based on data appearing in the following paper:
Fuel
Production Development
Aerophysics
Harber, Bernard D., "How
do Changing Demands for Manpower and Technical Production Affect the
Economy of Industry and the Community?", Conference on Space, Science
and Urban Life, Dunsmuir House, Oakland, California, March 1963.
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By 1963, not only had the number of square feet devoted to re-
search and development at North American Aviation increased from 80,000
to 1,629,930, but the types of laboratories included the following:
Thermoelectrical
Thermonic
Instrument Calibration
Physiology and Ecology
Gas Dynamics
Astronomical
Nucleonics
Material Research
Process Development
Production Development
Vibration and Shock
Propulsion
Aerothermal
Thermodynamics
Electronic
Computing
Simulation
Space Science
Life Science
Acoustic
Ali of these changes in the manpower, skills, and facilities require-
ments generated by the space age have not only added to the overall com-
plexities of the space program, but have encouraged aerospace managers
in government and industry to give additional and thoughtful consideration to
such questions as: _That are some of the future manpower trends in the
aerospace industry, in terms of total numbers, ratios of production to non-
production workers, and skills distribution? How have scientists and engi-
neers specifically affected the aerospace industry's organization and manage-
ment structure ? How has technology, national policy and military strategy
influenced the trend away from mass production to limited production of
complex systems ?
SOVIET SPACE DEVE LOPME NTS
One of the most significant factors affecting aerospace decision making
and planning is the space accomplishments of the Soviet Union. For ezample t
their demonstrated ability to achieve space "firsts" (i.e., the first earth sat-
ellite, the first man in orbit, and the first to soft land tnstnlments on the
moon) is not only a direct challenge to our technical and managerial competence,
but to our international: prestige; whereas, the military implications of their
space program pose a threat to our natio_l security and defense posture.
In addition to challenging our prestige and security as a nation, the
Soviet space program directly or indirectly influences: 1) national policy,
as formulated by the President, Congress, and the heads of government
agencies; 2) the amount and distribution of the annual federal space budget;
3) the decisions made by aerospace management in both Government and
industry; 4) the priority, scheduling and planning of the various DOD and
NASA programs; and 5) the direction and scope of American technological
developments.
To illustrate: In 1958, Congress increased federal appropriations
for space over twofold_from $347 million to $759 million; a new government
agency, the National Aero_utics and Space Administration was created; and
a 10-year plan for the peaceful exploration of space was submitted and approved--
all in response to the challenge of the Soviet Sputnik.
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It is significant that unmanne.d space flight programs were given a
dominant place in this plan as well as in the associated budget allocations.
For example, in the NASA budget for Fiscal Year 1959, only $58 million was
appropriated for manned programs; whereas $128 million was set aside for
unmanned spacecraft and related launch vehicle developments.
V_dle it is reasonably certain that the initial space budgets, the
space-policy decisions made Within the Executive and Legislative branches
of government, as well as the configuration of our first long-range space
plan with its emphasis on lmm_ed systemS, Were to Some degree related
to the technological state of the art, there are indications that pre-1961 space
policies were also based on: 1) the assumption by U. S. policy makers that
the Russians were concentrating most of their effort on unmanned space flight,
and 2) the belief within the Executive branch of the federal government that
there was relatively little to be gained in terms of scientific, military, or
national prestige, by extending manned space flight programs beyond the
then indefinite Project Mercury.
On April 12, 1961, another event took place which again focused
attention on the relationship between Soviet space activities and our own space
policies. On that date, the Soviet Union launched the Vostok I with Cosmonaut
Yuri Gagarin aboard. This time, the reaction within the Executive and
Legislative branches of our federal government was more rapid, direct, and
realistic than had been the case after Sputnik I. one of the first positive steps
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was taken by the late President Kennedy on May 25, 1961, one month after
the Gagarin flight. In a special message to Congress on Urgent National
Needs, the President stated:
It is time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space
achievement which in many ways may hold the key to our future
on earth .... I believe that this nation should commit itself to
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man
on the moon and returning him safely to earth ....
Let it be clear that I am asking Congress and the country to
accept a firm commitment to a new course of action--a course
which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs. *
The following day, the President submitted requests for an additional
$549 million for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including
Q
an increase in appropriations for manned spaceflight from $104 million to $234
million. In addition, the funds for Saturn, the high-thrust booster system
associated with the man-in-space program, were increased from $224 million
to $273 million. Thus, the national space program shifted dramatically and
rapidly from a "business as usual" basis to a faster pace, with the emphasis
now on manned rather than unmanned flight.
Gagarin's flight and the subsequent message from the President not
only brought about changes in the pace and expenditure levels of the space
program, hut resulted in the creation of new organizations and facilities within
* Urgent National Needs, A Special Message to Congress by President Kennedy,
published by the Department of State, Washington, D. C., May 25, 1961
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NASA, e.g., the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Manned Spacecraft
Center. In addition, such man-in-space programs as Gemini, and the Saturn V
were initiated, and existing NASA plans and schedules were revised. For
example, in an effort to match Russian progress, the initial plan to land a
U. S. astronaut on the moon was re-evaluated and the date for the lunar
landing was changed from the post-1970 to pre-1970 time period. Even the
selection of the technique for landing men on the moon was made with an
eye to the new time schedule. * Furthermore, to meet the objectives of the
revised man-in-space program, General Electric and the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company were asked to form new organizations (e. g.,
BeUcomm) to provide NASA with systems analysis and integration support
for the man-in-space and lunar landing programs.
Following the Gagarin flight the Soviet Union throughout the 1961-1964
period continued to launch both manned and unmanned aircraft of the Vostok
and Kosmos series as well as unmanned lunar and planetary spacecraft.
These launchings indicated a significant step-up in the number and variety
of Soviet spacecraft and an increase in the overall pace of the Soviet space
program. The overall impact of this accelerated Soviet activity on our own
space program is difficult to determine other than the fact that between
April 1961 and 1965, the U. S. space budget increased from $1.8 billion
* "Report on Space Programs", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago,
Illinois, May 1963, p. 22.
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to $6.9 billion and the number of spacecraft launched by the United States
increased signfficantly. How much of this was a result of prior planning and
how much a reaction to Soviet accomplishments is difficult to determine (see
Fig. 10).
However, one Soviet spectacular that may have had a direct and signifi-
cant impact on our own program was the twin launchings of Vostokts HI and IV
on August 11 and 12, 1962p respectively. These two vehicles came very close
to rendezvous without docking. One specific indication of the possible impact
of this Soviet spectacular on our own program was the change in the Gemini
flight schedule. Before the twin Vostok flights, the first unmanned flight
by Gemini was scheduled in late 1963 or early 1964. After the simultaneous
Vostok HI and IV launcldngs the first unmnnn_d flight was rescheduled for
mid-1963 and the first manned flight in late 1964. * However, subsequent
program delays forced another change in the Gemini schedule so that the first
unmanned flight took place on April 8, 1964, and the first manned flight on
March 23, 1965.
Another reaction to the twin Vostok flights came from the late President
Kennedy on August 13, 1962. On that date in a nationally televised address,
he commented that the U. S. was behind the U.S.S.R. in space exploration
* Posture on the National Space_Program, Report of the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics, Washington, D. C., May 1963, p. 6.
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FICURE 12
SUNMARYCOMPARISON OF U. S.--SOVIET SPACE FLIGHTS
_I_D S_S
LAUNCH VEHICLES SPACECRAFT
Expended Successful Orbited Escaped Failed
1957 1 0 0 0 1
1958 17 5 5 0 12
1959 20 10 9 1 11
1960 29 16 16 1 14
1961 41 29 35 0 14
1962 59 52 54 4 13
1963 46 38 60 0 11
1964 64 57 69 4 8
1965 70 63 94 3 8
1966" 20 19 24 0 1
TOTAL: 367 289 366 13 93
SOVIET UNION
LAUNCH VEHICLES SPACECRAFT
Expended Successful Orbited Escaped Failed
1957 2+U 2 2 0 U
1958 I+U 1 1 0 U
1959 3+U 3 (1) 3(2) U
1960 5-HJ 3 3 0 4+U
1961 6+U 6 6 1 I+U
1962 20+U 20 20 1 5+U
1963 17+U 17 17 1 I+U
1964 30-1-g 30 36 2 l+g
1965 48-1-U 48 66 7 2+U
1966" 16+U 16 17 2 1+0
TOTAL: 148+U 146 168 17 15+U
* Complete through Hay 3, 1966.
U Unknowns
The above data, updated through Hay 3, 1966, was obtained from a paper prepared
by Dr. Charles S. Sheldon, Member of the Professional Staff of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council. See, Porter, Richard W., and Sheldon, Charles
S., "A Comparison of the United States and Soviet Space Programs," Paper No. 10,
Program of Policy Studies, The Ceorge Washington University, Washington, D. C.,
June 1965.
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and that it would "be behind for a period in the futare .... We are making
a major effort now, and this country will be heard from in space as well
as in other areas in the coming months and years."
The next Soviet spectacular to Imve an effect on the U. S. space pro-
gram was the flight of Cosmonauts Leonov and Belyayev in Voskhod H on
IV_arch 18, 1965. During this mission Cosmonaut Leonov took the first ,,walk"
in space. The direct impact of this accomplishment was felt in the Gemini
program which was accelerated significantly in the following months. For
example, prior to Leonov's "walk" tile first exit of a U. S, astronaut from
Gemini was schedtded afte_._.rrthe GT-IV and GT-V flights, ** Under the new
accelerated schedule the first walk in space by a U. S. astronaut occurred
on June 3, 1965.
It would be an over-generalisation to state that all changes in our
space program between 1957 and the present were no more than reactions
to Soviet efforts; however, there is enough evidence to indicate that Russian
space accomplishments have and will continue to influence the magnitude,
direction, funding and organization of our space effort as well as the related
decision-making and planning.
* United States Aeronautics and Space Activities, Report to the Congress
from the President of the United States, January 31, 1966, p. 9.
** 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings before the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Part 2, Washington, D. C., March 1965, p. 44.
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To understand these relationships it is necessary to examine the Soviet
space effort in some detail. However, in contrast to the United States, the
U.S.S.R. publishes very little specific data about their current or _atre
space effort, particularly the launching dates, the booster characteristics,
or the precise objectives to be attained. However, a survey of Soviet space
developments indicates that while secrecy conceals the specifics, the Soviet
Union has not concealed the larger goals and expectations of their space
program. * This fact has been noted by Dr. F. J. Krieger, a Soviet space
specialist at the RAND Corporation. He reported that, "The Soviet scientists
(and political leaders) not only have clearly specified their goals well in
advance, but have ccnsistently attained them with apparent ease ."**
To illustrate, on March 14, 1961, one month before Gagarin's flight,
former Soviet Premier Khrushehev declared, "The time is not far off when
the first (Soviet) spaceship with a man on board will soar into space." Later
at the 22rid Congress of the Communist Party on October 17, 1961, Khrushehev
said, "In the immediate future the Soviet Union will orbit a team of cosmonauts,
soft land a vehicle on the moon, place a satellite in orbit around the moon, and
finally attempt to orbit the planets of Mars and Venus." The concurrent
* Soviet Space Programs, Staff Report, Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Washington, D. C., May 31, 1962, pp. 71-72.
** F. J. Krieger_ "Soviet Space Experiments and Astronautics," .Aerospace_
En_ineeringo Vol, 20 0961), 35,
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launchings of Vostoks HI and IV in August 1962, the continuing series of
Venus and Mars probes, and the more recent soft lunar landing by Luna 9
and lunar orbiting missions by Luna 10, affirm Khrushchevts earlier
predictions.
Other indications of future Soviet space goals were obtained at a press
conference on August 11, 1961, on the occasion of cosmonaut Titov's orbital
flight, when Academician L. I. Sedov, one of the top Soviet space scientists
said, "Our scientists and designers are working according to a broad plan.
They are working on the further development of orbital flights; they are working
on flights to the closest planets." At the same conference, Academician
Me Keldysh stated, "The flight of Soviet spaceship satellites shows that the
time is approaching when men will be able to penetrate far into space and
realize age-old dreams of flights to the i_Loon, Mars, and Venus, and even
more remote regions of the universe o *
After Yuri Gagarints orbital flight on April 1961, a series of more
specific future space objectives was described by Professor N. A. Varvarov,
who declared, "This (Gagarin's flight) wfll be followed by the construction of
flying laboratories with crews of several men, the launching of satellites to
Mars and Venus, and the landing of a rocket with scientific instruments on
* Soviet Space Programs, p. 89.
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t he Moon. After having orbited the Moon and returned toEarthj rockets with
crews will be launched to land on the moon and return to Earth. All of these
tasks have been thoroughly thought out and can be implemented in the coming
years." *
On March 12, 1964, Cosmonaut Titov was quoted on Moscow radio
as favoring the establishment of an orbital launch facility as a way to inter-
planetary travel. He said the moon would be the first target and orbital
flights of up to 14 days would not surprise anyone. With regard to the
moon: "I am convinced that we will witness such flights .... I do not know
who will make the flight. At least we have such hopes, and there is a basis
to presume that we will get a flight to the moon."
More recenfly_ on April 6j lS36, Cosmonaut Lenov, speaking in
Budapest, said that the Soviet Union will land a man on the moon during the
current five-year plan (1965-1970). Later 0 on April 100 1966, Cosmonaut
Titov predicted that "builders and assemblers will soon appear in space"
and even build small towns on the moon. "They will exit into space and put
together various parts of space stations, assemble spaceships and stations
on the moon and various structures." Adding, "That the moon would even-
tually become a giant space center where spaceships will be built for flights
into the universe." *
* Soviet Space Programs, p. 85.
** New York Times, April 11, 1966, p. 3_.
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These previous and current statements outlining future Soviet goals
cannot be considered as just so muchpropaganda. While it is true that a
propagandaelement is introduced into their spaceprograms (as it is in all
Soviet activities), an analysis of past Soviet accomplishments indicates that
there is very close correlation between the predictions of their key officials
and scientists, and subsequent space vehicle launchings. Consequently,
there is no reason to assume that they will fail to attain their stated future
goals. In fact, when their predicted space objectives are evaluated against
a background of past Soviet achievements and compared with analogous U. S.
space plans and technological developments, a reasonably logical outline of
future Soviet space capabilities can be postulated, and their possible impact
on the U. S. space effort determined (see Fig. 13 ).
Current Activities
The simultaneous launchings of Vostoks HI and IV in August 1962
as well as Palet I on November 1, 1963, and Polet II on April 12, 1964,
indicate that the U. S. S. R.
rendezvous in earth orbit.
is continuing its efforts to achieve a manned
While earlier Vostok latmchings appeared to
indicate that a successful Soviet rendezvous would take place before the
See, Military Procurement AuthorizaUon- 1964, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washing ton, D. C., February and
March 1963, p. 922, Testimony of General Curtis LeMay.
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end of 1965, the goal has not been attained. However, it is possible the Soviet
Unfon decided that such a rendezvous will not take place until they are able to
launch in series their newerm_l heavier 27,000 pound Proton spacecraft_an
event that could take place in 1966.
While this would not have been the case had a Soviet rendezvous
occurred in 1965, U. S. reaction to such an event in late 1966 will be con-
siderably minimized owing to the successful rendezvous of Gemini 6 and
Gemini 7 on December 15, 1965. Nevertheless, a successful rendezvous in
orbit by the U.S.S.R. in 1966 could possibly reduce some of the growing
criticism of the U. S. space effort, encourage the proponents of a more.
energetic military space program, and possibly lead to an increase in
federal expendihzres for space technology for fiscal year 1968, particularly
for Apollo applications and the M0L program. This reaction would very
likely take place ff the Soviet rendezvous involved larger boosters, the
assembly in orbit of several 27,000 pound Proton spacecraft, and greater
numbers of men than the prior U. S. effort.
If the Russians carry out an orbital rendezvous in 1966, with a series
of Proton spacecraft, they could develop enough experience in complex,
assembly-in-orbit operations to begin constructing the first multi-manned
space station by the end of 1966 or the beginning of 1967. A number of Russian
scientists have indicated that such develolxnent is part of the Soviet space plan.
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Among these is G. G. Kuznetsov, a physics professor who stated that it would
be possible "in the not distant future to create a big, permanent, artificial
earth sputnik which will serve as a hugh scientific laboratory to conduct
research into various types of cosmic radiation and study the effect of space
flight on the human organism." He further stated tint, "Eventually this
sputnik will serve as a unique kind of transit station for human flights to the
moon and other planets of the solar system." *
In addition to the uses suggested by Professor Kuznetsov, a Soviet
space station based on Proton modules could have a number of military and
non-military uses, owing to its inherently large interior dimensions and pay-
load capabilities. It could serve as an astronomical observatory, a space
communications, navigation or television station, and an orbital offense/
defense weapons system; or it could be utilized by the U.S.S.r. as an oper-
ational support facility, e.g., a staging base for a manned lunar landing,
or a space command-control station to augment their existing ground-based,
launching, tracking, and recovery network.
Based on the estimated payload capabilities of the new Soviet booster,
the manned space station could be comprised of a series of individual Proton
modules, each weighing approximately 30,000 pounds. With modules of
* Aviation Week, February 15, 1960, p. 31.
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this size, plus orbital rendezvous and assembly techniques, the U.S.S.R.
could construct permanent space stations with gross weights ranging from
60,000 to 100,000 pounds. *
The effect of such a development on.the U. S. space effort cannot
he determined specifically, but there is no question that if the_oviet Union
were to assemble a large-multi-manned space station in earth orbit before
1967, our somewhat indefinite post-Apollo programs would crystallize and a
more vigorous effort would be initiated in both the Apollo Applications and
MOL programs, including the design of new configurations of Gemini and/or
Apollo for orbital re-supply and transfer. However, it has been estimated
that the cost of accelerating th_ DOD and NASA space station projects would
increase the U. S. space budget by as much as $1 bfllton to $5 billion. **
* This may he a conservative estimate inasmuch as on September 7, 1963,
Moscow Radio announced that the Soviet Union was on the verge of carrying
out a rendezvous of two space ships in orbit, adding, that such a rendezvous
is necessary for the construction of large space stations weighing several
hundred tons.
** National Space Goals for Post-Apollo Period, p. 73.
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In addition to expanding operations in the earth orbital region, *
conservative extrapolations of Soviet space technology indicate that the
Russians should be capable of launching heavier and more complex vehicles
into cislunar and lunar space between now and the end of 1967. These space-
craft could include additional and heavier unmanned lunar orbiters similar to
Lusa 10, designed to provide detailed photographs of the surface of the moon,
and soft lunar landers such as Lure 9 which would carry an ,mm_,med mobile
laboratory to the moon's surface. However, one of the most significant
Soviet accomplishments of tl_ 1966-1967 time period could be the launching
of a multi-manned spacecraft on a circumltmar flight. This objective was
cited by G. I. Pokrovsky, a leading Soviet space scientist as an exsmple of
"projected priority work." **
* Other than vertical rocket launchings of instrumented scientific payloads
carried out between 1950 and 1962, plus some educated speculation, there is
not enough data to make a forecast of future Soviet operations in the sub-
orbital region of space. For example, there is no detailed information to
indicate that the Russians have been testing an X-15 spacecraft, or have
conducted sub-orbital flights similar to those which involved astronauts
Sbephard and Grissom in the Mercury-Redstone vehicles. For a discussion
of the possible development of an X-20 (Dymsoar) or Scramjet type vehicles
within the USSR, see Department of Defense Al_uropriatious for 1962, Part 4,
C0ngressib_l Committee on Appropriations, ..Washtngtonj D..C., April 20,
1961, p. 27; Comprehensive Analysis of'goviet Space Pro;grams, Comine_ce
Department 0 Air Information Division, V_ashtngton, D. C., May 22, 1961,
pp. 12-30; and Aviation Week, January 28, 1962, p. 38.
** Soviet Space Programs, p. 89.
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The circumlunar spacecraft could be assembled in space from Voekhcd
and/or Proton modules launched individually into earth orbit, or the vehicle
could be a single Voskhod unit launched from the earth on a circumlunar
trajectory by their new 2.fi to 3.0 million pound booster. What specific
effect this accomplishment would have on the U. S. space program is diffi-
cult to determine; however, NASA might, as a consequence, decide to utilize
a modified Gemini capsule and a Saturn I booster, to carry out a similar
circumlunar flight, or the mission could be bypassed entirely and additional
emphasis placed on a Sl_ed-up of the Apollo lunar landing effort.
While most of the "spectacular" Soviet space activity in the 1966-1967
time period should take place in the earth orbital, cislunar and lunar regions,
the Russians should continue throughout 1966-1967, to launch unmanned
probes toward l_ars and Venus in an attempt to broaden their technological
and operational base, and to challenge the planetary exploration program of
the United States.
1967-1970 Time Period
Between 1967 and 1970, the Soviet Union should have acquired enough
"on.fl2e sbelf I and reliable spacecraft and launch vehicles as well as the re-
lated operational experience to have a number of possible mission options.
As noted by Mr. James Webb, NASA Administrator, "The Russians will not
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be limited by booster capability for anything that they chooseto try to accom-I
pllsh in space; that they have built into their systems sufficient options for
payloads so that they can select those that are to their greatest advantage;
and, that they have the booster eapabflity to put those payloads where they
want to put them." *
However, while the Soviet Union will have a wide spectrum of space
options to choose from between 1967 and 1970, the most significant Soviet
space development may not take place in earth orbital, cislunar or planetary
space, or even in the area of possible military applications, but in what they
accomplish on the moon's surface. For example, before 1969_ the Soviet
Union should have the man-rated boosters_ the associated technology, and tim
operational experience to land a manned spacecraft on the moon. This mission
has been cited by leading Soviet scientists, cosmonauts and politicians as one
of their priority goals. ** If they carry out a lunar landing before 1969, the
USSR could win the moon race by at least one year, unless the pace of the
Apollo program can be increased signlflcantly.
* NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967, p. 47.
** In October 1963, former Premier Khrushchev was reported to have said
that the Russians were not going to the moon. This statement later turned
out to be a misinterpretation of his remarks.
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There are indications that the Soviet Union will employ earth orbit
rendezvous rather tlmn a lunar orbit mode, to land men on the moon. * In
the earth orbit mode the Russians could utilize an improved verst_xt of the
Vostck or Voskhod spacecraft as building blocks with earth orbit-to-moon
propulsion and landing modules attached. ** To launch the lunar spacecraft
modules the new Proton booster with high-energy upper stages could be
used. The development, by 1968-1969, of a lunar lander based on Vostck,
Voskhod or Proton, an advanced version of the Proton booster, and multiple
launching and orbital assembly techniques are within the estimated technological
capabilities of the Soviet Union.
There is no doubt that if the Soviet Union were to carry out a lunar
landing before the United States it would have a significant effect on our inter-
national prestige as well as the structure of our own space program. For
example, there is a distinct possibility that a Soviet manned lunar landing
in the 1969 time period would result in a critical examination of our entire
program. This could lead, in turn, to a decision to initiate either a massive
* Washington Star, January 26, 1963. It is quite possible that the USSR
will maintain its time-rocket-thrust lead over the United States, well into
the 1966-1970 time period; consequently, their technique for landing a man
on the moon may not he subject to the time and payload constraints that in-
fluenced the selection of lunar orbit rendezvous, i.e., the U.S. me_od for a
manned lunar landing.
** For a discussion of the Vostek and some of its potentialities, see J. S. Butz,
"What Are The Lessons of the Vostok", Air Force and Space Digest _ March
1962, p. 36.
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crash effort aimed at closing the "lunar gap," or to leap-frog the moon
program and aim for the first manned landing on Mars. If a Mars, rather
than a lunar landing was established as a U. S. objective, higher priorities
would have to be placed on developing a manned space station as a planela_ry
training and flight simulator; on a nuclear version of the Saturn V; and on an
enlarged bio-medical research effort; while the current high priority lunar
programs as well as many of the unmanned satellite programs would have
to be reoriented.
Post 1970 Time Period
Following a series of manned and unmanned lunar landings, the USSR
should be capable of establishing a permanent manned base on the moon in
the post-1970 time period. The initial facility would probably be an austere
station, somewhat similar to the one set up under Operation Deep Freeze in
the Antarctic, with the prime emphasis on determining if man can survive in
the lunar environment for an extended period of time.
To construct and support the lunar base the Soviet Union may lmve to
develop an advanced Nova-type booster with a gross weight in the 6 million
to 8 million pound class and a thrust of 15 million to 20 million pounds, and/or
nuclear upper stages. Such developments will permit order of magnitude
improvements in their current booster payload-to-gross weight ratios, and
as a consequence, the Soviets should be able, in the mid or late 1970's to
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place individual payloads of 500,000 to 1,000,000 pounds or more, into
low earth orbits, or send cargo vehicles weighing 200,000 to 400,000 pounds
to the vicinity of the moon. *
Furthermore, with boosters and payloads of this capacity, the Soviet
Union could launch and assemble in orbit the various modules required for
a manned planetary spacecraft. Based upon a survey of analogous U. S.
developments, the manned planetary spacecraft could be assembled from
basic nuclear powered stages each weighing 200,000 to 250,000 pounds, with
the crew and mission support modules attached. ** The total weight of this
spacecraft in earth orbit would vary with the specific mission, i.e,, plsnetary
fly-by or landing, and the launckyear. For a range of planetary missions and
launch years the weight-in-orbit of the manned planetary spacecraft would
vary from 1 to 5 million pounds. However, the time when the Soviet Union
would launch the first manned planetary spacecraft is dependent upon such
things as national intenfionsD available resources, technological develop-
ments and the launch year or window. Assuming the USSR decides that a
* For a discussion on Soviet nuclear rocket developments see Donald J. Richie,
Soviet Rocket Propulsion, paper presented at the Fifth Symposium on Ballistic
Missile and Space Technology, Los Angeles, California, August 1960. For an
e_raulation of U. S. nuclear rocket capabilities see l_oject Rover, Hearings
before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Congress,
Washington, D. C., February 27-28 and March l, 6, and 7, 1961; and Aer_.___
space Engineering, May 1961_ p. 14.
** NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967_ pp. 565-569.
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manned planetary mission is desirable and their technological pace is
essentially similar to our own, it is possible that the initial Soviet manned
planetary missions could take place in the late 1970's or early 1980's.
In addition to the development of radically new propulsion and space-
craft systems, there is some evidence that the Soviet Union is working on a
recoverable, air-breathing booster which would probably be available in
the post-1970 time period. The possibility that such a vehicle is under develop-
ment within the USSR has been mentioned in a report published on May 22, 1961,*
as well as in statements made by Artem Mikoyan, a leading Soviet aircraft
designer. **
As described in the i_ports, the air-breathing booster has a winged
configuration, propelled by a combination of turbojets and ramjet engines,
and is employed to launch upper stage rockets and spacecraft. After staging,
the air-breathing booster returns, under the control of a pilot, and lands
like a conventional aircraft. Analogous systems are under "building block"
development in the United States; the most promising being the Scramjet, a
supersonic, combustion ramjet powered vehicle which is designed to fly from
subsonic to orbital speeds. *** The chief advantages of such a vehicle are:
* Comprehensive Analysis of Soviet Space Program, Commerce Depart-
ment, Air Information Division, Washington, D. C., May 22, 1961, pp. 12-30.
** Aviation Week, January 28, 1963, p. 38.
Scramjet Flight Test Program, the Marqusrdt Corporation, Van Nuys,
California, September 1965.
133
re-usability, thus reduced opemUonal costs, and the ability to deliver a given
payload into orbit at a minimum cost per pound; plus a capability for taking
off and landing like a conventior_l aircraft.
In addition to its use as an air-breathing booster, this versatile system
could be utilized as an orbital patrol vehicle, as a logistic support system for
an orbital space station, or as a hypersonic transport aircraft. In this latter
role it would be a strong competitor to the supersonic transport currently
under development in the West. If a hypersonic transport vehicle were devel-
oped and flown by the Soviet Union several years before the U. S. or West
Europe could develop such a vehicle, It would not only mean serious economic
competition, but it would be a major blow to U. S. technological competence
and prestige.
It should be re-emphasized at this point that any of the current and
future Soviet space developments could evolve into military systems when
and if a requirement arises. This is to be expected inasmuch as the USSR
]ms never differentiated between scientific and military research and develop-
ment, and Soviet leaders by their past actions and statements have frequently
stressed the military significance of their technological achievements. This
fact was highlighted by Soviet Academician L. I. Sedov, a leading Soviet
space scientist, who stated, "there is one large team in Russia that handles
all space projects. The same key men are in charge of guidance, tracking,
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and other segments for each of the projects. It is a very large team and
it can well take care of several projects in parallel. We have no distinction
between military and civilian projects." * And in 1958, Soviet Major General
PokrovskU, a member of the Soviet space agency, said "the development
of technology has led to arUflcial earth satellites which, together with their
scientific value, also have military significance. From them it is possible
to observe the o_ponent's territory and to throw atomic bombs on that terri-
tory." • * Moreover, when the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing in
1961, former Premier Khrushchev said that the heavy-thrust boosters which
powered Gagarin and Titov into orbit could also deliver 50 to 100 megaton
warheads to any point on earth. The estimated thrust of their boosters,
the physical size of the Vostok, Voskhod and Proton capsules, and the possi-
bility that in their underground test series the Soviets have greatly improved
their warhead weight to yield ratios, adds an element of realism to _s
earlier statement.
Further evidence tlmt the Soviet Union does not draw a line between
military and non-military space projects is revealed in the organization of
the Interdepartmental Commission of Interplanetary Communications within
-- . $$$ --
the USSR Academy of _clences. waue most of the members, such as
Congressional Record, Washington, D. C., August I, 1963, p.13103.
** McMillan, Brockway, "The Military Role in Space," Astronautics, American
zlocket Society, October 1962, p. 18.
Reported to have been changed to the Commission on Exploration and Use
of Outer Space. See Astronautics_ November 1962, p. 178.
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P. I. Kzpltsa and L. I. Sedov, are senior scientists connected with institutes
of higher learning, a number of them are directly associated with the military.
Academician A. A. Blagonoravov, for example, is a Lieutenant General of
artillery and is a specialist in automatic weapons. Go I. Pokrovskii, a
nuclear weapons and missile expert, is a Major Ge_ ral of the Soviet Armyls
technical services. V. F. Bolkhovitinov is a professor at the Military Air
Academy. Colonel Y. A. Pobedonostev is a professor of aerodynamics at
Moscow • State University where he specializes in gas dynamics, and has
worked on launch facility and rocket engine dealgn.
A more direct indication of Soviet interest in mflltary space applications
appeared in a recent book entitled "Soviet Military StrategY' and edited by
Soviet Marshal V; S. Sokolovsky. In a section of the book devoted to the
use of space for military purposes, the authors stated:
Soviet military strategy acknowledges the need to study the
use of space and space vehicles to reinforce the defense of
the socialist countries. The need to ensure the security of
our Motherland, the interests of the whole socialist common-
wealth I and the desirability of preserving peace on earth de-
mand this (a Soviet mfliiary study of space). It would be a
mistake to allow the imperialist camp to gain any superi-
ority in this area. The imperialists must be opposed with
more effective weapons and methods of using space for
defense. Only in this was can they be forced to refrain
from the use of space for a destructive devastating war. *
* Sokolovsky (ed.)l Soviet Military Strategy, trans. H. S. Dinerstein et al.__.
(Englewood Cliffsp N.J.: Prentlce-Hall, Inc._ 1963), p. 42V.
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American spokesmen have also indicated that they believe the Soviet
space program has a distinct military orientation. For example, General
Le May, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee stated
that is was his personal belief that "the Russian space program is entirely
military," and F. J. Krieger, specialist in Soviet technology of the RAND
CorporaUon, indicated that the Soviet aerospace program is part of the total
Soviet military effort. Moreover, there is some evidence to indicate that
some of the Kosmos spacecraft may be military reconnaisance satellites.
Nevertheless, and in spite of belligerent statements and past actionsp
the Soviet Union has yet to place a military system in space that is a direct
and open threat to the United States--at least one that can be identified as
such.
Yet, of all the possible future Soviet space activities, the one which
would have the greatest effect on the composition and evolution of the U. S.
space program is the development of a military space capability by the USSR
particularly if it is an offensive system, or is designed to restrict in any
way the U.S. access to the space environment. There is no question that the
USSR has the basic building Mocks for developing military space systems
and will deploy them, if the need arises. When their systems will be deployed
and what specific form they will take is difficult to predict. *
* See Donald A. Brennan, "Arms and Arms Control in Outer Space," Outer
Spa_, ed. the American Assembly, Columbia University (Eng!ewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 123-149.
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This is the dilemma facing those who advocate a heavier build-up
in our military space program. They understand and can focus attention on
the potentia_y threatening nature of the Soviet space program but they cannot
point, conclusively, to a specific and direct Soviet threat from space and
consequently, cannot present strong arguments for additional development
and increased expenditures for a military space program in the United States.
Nevertheless, this does not minimize the fact that the series of tech-
nological achievements, beginning with Sputnik I, as well as the close ties
that exist between P_ssiats scientific and military community, gives positive
evidence of a well-planned space program with a dual objective in mind: 1) to
establish the scientific primacy of the USSR_ and 2) to develop a technical and
military capability to control the realm of space.
BUSINESS COMPETITION
Business competition is another major factor affecting the planning
and decision-making functions of aerospace executives. As a rule, indus-
trial executives are more concerned about inter-company competition--
namely that which occurs when company A and company B compete for
contract X--than their government counterparts. Nevertheless, aerospace
managers in both government and industry take the competitive aspects
of the industry into consideration in their planning and decision-making
functions. The executive in private industry, for example, must realisti-
cally appraise the strengths and weaknesses of his competitors before he can
establish realistic objectives, initiate planning activities and define his
organizationts short and long-term strategy, h_.a manner tlmt will
strengthen his companyts long-term competitive position. In addition to
comparing his company's overall capabilities vis-a-vis the competition, an
aerospace executive needs to watch for expected changes in competitive
business relationships, e.g., multi-company associations, diversification
moves, within the industry, as well as anticipated developments of a financial
or technological nature. By anticipating such actions or developments, a
company is able to stay one jump ahead of its competitors.
Knowledge about a competitor's strengths and weaknesses as well as pos-
sible "" competitive actions, which may alter the aerospace business
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environment, comes from a variety of sources, including company intelligence
and market research. Trade publications such as Aviation Week, and
management and planning service reports from organizaUons such as the
Stanford Research Institute and Arthur D. Little, Inc., provide a good deal
of information, both about the technical research activiUes of compeUtors and
about financial, organizational, or diversification moves that competitors are,
or may be, contemplating. Other excellent sources of data on compeUtors
are found in the testimony given by government and industry officials before
the Space Commi_ees of the U. S. House and Senate.
Another source of knowledge about anticipated competRve acUons
comes from an understanding of major Wends affecting the industry. The
planner or decision-maker may recognize that new government markets, e.g.,
transportation,urban development, are going to develop rapidly, and by data
collection, analysis and personal contacts is able to anticipate competitive
developments with a high degree of accuracy.
In addition to anticipating changes in competitive relationships and
markets, a company executive must also make assumptions regarding develop-
ments of a technical nature within the aerospace Industry. To do thls, it is
necessary for the aerospace e_r_cutive to understand the way in which development
in one area, say space guidance systems, is frequently dependent upon
progress in supporting or related areas, such as propulsion. In addition, he
must also have a "feel" for the business potential inherent in new and emerging
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technologies. A skillful planner, after completing a study of technological
trends, might also help the competitive position of the company greatly by
going one step further and encouraging company management to spend
relatively small amounts of money on exploratory research in an area that
appears, in the trend analysis j to be very promising.
While the aerospace industry is highly competitive, it is not
competitive in the same sense that General lViotors and the Ford Motor
Company are competitive. These differences are mainly a function of the
aerospace industryls unique characteristics and position in the American
economy. For example, the aerospace industry, unlike the more traditional
cammercial companies, designs and produces hardware primarily for
national defense and space exploration. Consequently, with the federal
government as its principal customer, the industry is at one and the same
time a private industrial concern and a prime instrument of national policy.
In addition, the industry is the largest single employer in this country and
is second only to the automobile industry in dollar volume of sales. However,
unlike the automobile industry, over 80 per cent of the products and services
of the aerospace industry are sold annually to the United States government.
Also, unlike its commercial associates, the aerospace industry is
heavily oriented to research and development activities, as evidenced by the
fact, that as the nationls principal reservoir of high-priced talent, it employs
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one-fifth of the nation's scientists and engineers. This has given the industry
a unique capability to solve the most complex technological problems.
However, because it has this problem-solving capability, the aerospace
industry has bad to develop an extraordinary degree of flexibility, take
greater than normal risksD and reach out beyond the leading edge of teclmo-
logy to a greater extent than consumer-oriented industries. Moreover, the
aerospace industry has had to adjust rapidly to quantum changes in a variety
of directions in order to survive, particularly, as the pace Of technology has
accelerated, as the military and technological capabilities of the Soviet Uhion
have increased and as national pOlicies have changed to meet these challenges.
The aerospace industry also has a unique relationship with the federal
government which commercial industries do not have. This relationship has
both negative and positive effects on the industries' business environment in
the sense that the government provides substantial funding to the aerospace
industry to develop and produce the most complex hardware ever developed.
This has a tendency to reduce some of the related financial risks. However,
since the American taxpayer is the source of the funding and national issues
are frequently involved, the federal government intrudes upon the affairs of
the aerospace industry to a greater extent than in commercial industry.
The fact that the federal government is both a prime source of funds,
and a purchaser of the products of the aerospace industry leads many to
believe that the industry, with a guaranteed income and one steady customer,
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is non-competitive. While there is some substance to this belief, the facts
indicate that pre-eontractual competition between specific companies
comprising the aerospace industry is keen with no guarantees from the
U. S. government that a specific eompanyts contract funding level will be
maintained year after year. This is flluSt_ted bY Figure 14 ab. It indicates
the changes that took place in the contractual position of the twenty-five top
NASA contractors between Fiscal Years 1961 and 1965. With the exception
of North American Aviation, Incorporated, and the Bendix Corporation, the
contractual status of twenty-three of the twenty-five companies in the F. Y.
1961 list changed by F. Y. 1965. Six of the twenty-three companies on the
F. Y. 1961 list improved their contract status between F. Y. 1961 and 1965,
whereas eight companies slipped to lower positions. However, nine of the
top twenty-five companies for F. Y. 1961 did not appear on the F. Y. 1965
list, again indicating the competitve nature of an industry that has been
referred to in some areas as a "kept" or "guaranteed income" lmiustry.
On the other side of the competitive coin is the federal government
and the agency maz_agers. They are also concerned about business compe-
Ution, but for different reasons than their industrial counterparts. For
example, the industrial executivets concern about his companyls competi-
tive status is directly related to the organizationls ability to survive, in a
i
* The competition between Boeing and General Dynamics for the TFX (F-Ill)
contract is a case in point.
FIGURE 14a
TOP TWENTY-FIVE NASA CONTRACTORS LISTED ACCORDING TO
NF.T VALUE OF DIRECT AWARDS
FISCAL YEAR 1961
ll
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Contractor Thousands
of Dollars
Total $423,294
North American Aviation Inc.
1VicDonnell Aircraft Corporation
Douglas Aircraft Company
Western Electric Company
Space Technology Laboratories
Chrysler Corporation
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
The Hayes Corporation
General Electric Company
Chan___ceVo._q_ht Co_.._rporati_.__on__
Radio Corporation of America
Brown Engineering Company, Inc.
Bendix Corporation
Aerojet General Corporation
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Honeywell, Inc.
Norair Engineering Corporation
General Dynamics Corporation
Flexonics Corporation
Ball Brothers Research Corporation
United Engineering & Construction, Inc.
Collins Radio Company
Arthur Vennerl Company
Carl N. Swenson Company
Ampex Corporation
Other
75,009
41,843
30,698
26,609
13,098
12,922
11,168
10,278
9,197
87,_ 73
8,580
6,680
6,481
6,286
3,335
2,730
2,512
2,135
2,128
2,025
2,000
1,994
1,969
1,835
1,685
131,324
Per Cent of
Total Awards
to Business
10__o0
18
10
7
6
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
3O
* Less than one-half of one per cent.
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business sense. The governmentexecutive, on the other hand, encourages
business compeUtion between company A and company B, in the hope that
such competition will result in a better product or service for a better price.
However, the government is also concerned when the competlUon reaches a
point where the public welfare or the development of a specific program is
jeopardized; or when the loss of the cc_npetith_n for a given contract by
company A results in unemployment, loss of Imsiness, and public ctrlticism
hi the region, st_ and city where company A is located.
Both NASA and DOD encourage the aerospace industry to be competitive
in a number of ways; one being the use of the incentive contract and the
other through the mechanics of the source-selection board.
The level and type of competition expected in the aerospace industry
was defined by NASA officials in testimony before Congress. They stated that:
The competitive base for awarding contracts is broadened to
include scientific and technical capebflitiss, management
competence as well as target costs. Oar experience with
cost-type contracting reveals that companies that ranked
highest in scientific, technical and managerial capabilities
are usually the ones qualified to direct the contract most
efficiently in terms of time, quality and reliability, and
therefore, at the lowest overall cost to the government.
* The percentage of competitive awards to industry has been increasing. In
1962, 55 per cent of NASA procurements, or $565 million, was placed through
the competitive processes; by the end Qf 1_64, this percentage bad increased
to 60 per cent, or _2.1 billion. Durin_ the first six months of FY _966_ 68 per
cent of NASA procurement was competitive. _ioreover, NASA and DOD po]lcy
to procure competitively to lhe maximum extent poss_%Ie will receive continuous
emphasis. See, 1966 NASA Au_.t_rization p Hearings before the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics, Washington, D. C., February and Aprfl"i965," '
pp. 272-273.
** Ibid__..p. 273.
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FIGURE 14b
TOP TWENTY-FIVE NASA cONTRACTORSLISTED ACCORDINGTO
NET VALUE OFDIRECT AWARDS
FISCAL YEAR 1965
196.__..11 Contractor Thousands
Rank of Dollars
Per Cent of
Total Awards
to Business
1
i
7
3
9
2
w
14
18
11
6
13
5
m
15
22
12
8
16
mid
Total $4,141,434
1. North American Aviation, Ins,
2. Boeing Company
3. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
4. Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.
5. General Electric Company
6. McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
T. Interoationsl Buelness Mackt_s Co_
8. AeroJet-General Corporation
9. General Dynamics Corporation
I0.._... Radio Cor_._poration of Ameri_..__ ----
11. Chrysler Corporation
12. General Motors Corporatlon
13. Bendix Corporation
14. Space Technology Laboratorles
15. United Aircraft Corporation
16. Sperry Rand Corporation
17, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
18. Collins Radio Company
19. Brown Engineering Company, Inc.
20. Philco Corporation
21. Hayes Corporation
22. Honeywell, Incorporated
23. Hughes Aircraft Company
24. Catalytic Construction Company
25. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
i,099,448
305,988
267,226
251,668
181,472
166,6TO
128,312
123,186
111,148
.._106_552
85.986
T2,531
66,100
50,533
43,330
39,401
35,796
31,532
30,850
30,029
28,496
27,068
26,457
25,296
20,862
100_00
26,55
V,39
6,45
6.08
4.38
4.02
3.10
2.97
2.68
2.57
2.08
1.T5
1.60
1.22
1.05
.95
.86
.T6
.V4
.V3
.69
.65
.64
.61
.50
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As previously noted, the federal government also encourages competition
in the aerospace industry through the mechanics of the source selection board
and related processes. ; For eKample, in selecting contractors to develop and
produce specific hardware, the government evaluates in detail the competing
companies' defense or space systgms proposals in terms of system design,
productibility, maintainability, operational effectiveness, costs, lead time,
contractor capability and past performance. It is obvious that companies
submitting bids on a given space or weapons system must not only be able to
show "across-the-board" competence in each of the above areas, but to increase
the probability of winning the contract, must be able to convince the govern-
ment source selection board th,,tt their particular design, its production,
maintenance, cost, lead time, and operational characteristics, as well as
the overall management capabilities and performance of their company is
superior, azd therefore, more competitive.
A statement from the Defense Industries Advisory Council (DIAC) of
the Department of Defense highlights the role of DOD's source selection
process in stimulating intercompany competition as follows:
The source selection procedure should encourage the proper
kind of competition for the attainment and demonstration of
the proper objectives. A marketplace must be created and
maintained in which this competition can take place. That
marketplace must provide rewards for risk taking on the
part of industrial concerns--including investments in facili-
ties, the commitment of financial resources, and the commit-
ment of competent people and teams toward objectives which
properly serve government requirements. *
• TFX Contract Investigation, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Part 5, Washtugton, D. C., May-June 1963, p. 1523.
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The competitive nature of the aerospace industry, its relationship
with the government and its unique position in the national economy was
more than adequately summarized by Karl G• Harr, Jr _, President of the
Aerospace Industries Association, who stated that the aerospace industry is:
•.. a highly competitive industry and daffy growing more so.
It must operate in a goldfish bowl under the closest scrutiny
of the publlc_ the Congress, the executive agencies of the
federal government and the press. It must not only work
at the forefront of scientific and technological knowledge, it
must advance those frontiers in order to survive. It plays
for unique stakes in that its product underpins not only the
safety of our traveling public but also our national security
and our national prestige, *
All of this must be done by an industry which has a severly
limited capability to influence or even predict the scope or needs of its
principal market• The industry must also operate within a framework of
government controls and in an environment of uncertainty arising from the
fact that the true nature of itsunique relationship with the government has
not been fully determined. Moreover, the industry, because of its highly
competitive and technological nature, must invest well over half of its
earnings into new equipment, facilities and research, even though its rate
of profitis approximately one-half the national industry average.
Finally, when a commercial firm goes into the marketplace to scll
Rs products in competition with other companies, it places its reputation
* Karl G. Hart 0 Jr., "The Aerospace Industry Today and Tomorrow,"
Speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, Aerospace Industries Association s
Washington, D. C. (n.d.)
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and the interests of its stockholders on the line, knowing that the price of
bad judgment or a poor product may be reduced sales or even bankruptcy.
However_ when an aerospace company enters into competition for a contract
the reputation that it ultimately lays on the line is not only its own but often
that of the United States. In this sense the stockholders that an aerospace
company represents are not only the companyts but the American people,
and rather than bankruptcy, the price of failure may range from a drop
in international prestige to national disaster.
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The dynamic increase in space activities since 1957 has brought
with it new and challenging management problems which have been
met in part by the creation of special organizations such as Bellcomm,
The Aerospace Corporation, Comsat and NASA, and has accelerated
the development of new management techniques such as PERT/Cost,
program budgeting, systems engineering, and long-range planning.
Partially as a consequence of these analytical, organizational and
procedural innovations a managerial revolution has taken place in
those private organizations and federal agencies directly involved
in the space program.
The management functions of planning and decision-making as
carried out by aerospace executives in the governn_ nt and private
industry, involve considerations of a complex spectrum of political,
social, economic and technical factors including: National space
goals and objectives, technological developments, and Soviet space
capabilities. In some cases these and other relevant factors are
evaluated intuitively by aerospace management, in other cases, a
particular factor or problem may be analyzed in great depth and
the findings submitted to the decision-maker in report form.
:_evelopments that are not c_irectly related to space and space tech-
nology can also affect national space policies and objectives. One
such example is the establishment by President Johnson in August
1365, of a "new' planning-programming-budgeting system within
the federal government. This system will have significant and far-
reaching impacts on the management of the federal government,
particularly on the policy and decision-making process, on the
relationship between the Legislative and _xecutive branches of
government and on the responsibilities and prerogatives of the
various federal agencies including NASA.
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Another factor that has affected national space goals and objectives
is the war in Vietnam. While current national commitments and
projects such as Apollo will not be greatly affected, there is no
question that the Vietnamese war has had a delaying effect on de-
cisions relative to post-Apollo goals and programs. How serious
this effect will be cannot be determined at this time since it is
dependent, to a major degree, on the future scope of the war and
the level of U.S. defense and international commitments.
If a reduction in cold war tension were to take place, it is possible
that the present agreement between the Soviet Union and the United
States, to cooperate in the coordinated launchings of weather and
geomagnetic satellites, might be expanded to include a joint effort
by the U, S. and the USSR to construct a lunar base, or carry out
an international expedition to Mars. If such agreements were to
become national goals, current space program schedules, project
priorities and budgets would be significantly modified and, conse-
quently, so would the plans and objectives of the aerospace industry.
At the present time space missions and the related operational
requirements are defiued almost entirely on the basis of individual
NASA and DOD responsibfli_es and needs, rather than on the basis
of overall national requirements. For example, while there is a
total national space program in concept, as well as at the organiza-
tional and operational levels, there are two semi-autonomous programs
with NASA responsible for the larger scientific, developmental and
exploratory effort and DOD, i.e., the Air Force, responsible for
the military space effort. While the current structure and orienta-
tion of the space program is parUzlly an outgrowth of past policies
and decisions made in response to Sputnik I, the duality of the
program is based primarily on separate civil and military needs
with duplication and program overlap minimized through a series
of NASA - DOD coordinating boards, panels and committees.
In some cases planners and decision-makers, particularly in private
industry, have operated on the basis of separate civil and military
space programs. In other cases industrial managers and their
planning staffs have considered the DOD and NASA programs as
complementary elements of a single national space effort and have
structured and implemented their plans accordingly.
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Aerospace planners recognize that space missions have been and
will continue to be carried out by military, as well as non-military
spacecraft. However, the civil space program--which has moved
ahead of military space activities (in terms of hardware development
and time schedules) in the exploration of earth orbital space--will
continue to maintain this lead in the exploration of cislunar, lunar,
and planetary space. This forward thrust by the civil space effort
into the outer limits of space cannot be paralleled by a military
space program if for no other reason than it becomes increasingly
difficult (in spite of any existing technological capabilities) to establish
military missions and requirements as the zone of operation shifts
away from the earth orbital to the lunar and planetary regions.
The space environment not only has a direct effect on spacecraft
design and operation but, consequently, on program costs, lead times
and launching schedules, as well as man's function and survival.
Therefore, an understanding of these various effects of the space
environment is an important input to any. space age '_ planning or
decision-making activity.
Of the many factors considered by aerospace executivies in their
planning and decision-making functions, technology is one of the
most--if not the most--significant. Not only do technological con-
siderations shape and motivate the executive's decision-making
process, but they affect the very character of the organization he
directs and controls: Its organizational structure, its competitive
position, its financial status, and its future growth and survival.
As manned space flight becomes more commonplace, there will be
an increased emphasis on bio-medical technology, particularly as
extended lunar and planetary explorations are planned and later
carried out. Of singular importance will be the development of
escape and survival techniques and equipment, as well as research
into the bio-medical, and psychological problems associated with
man's survival in a hostile, cramped, non-terrestrial environment,
for days, weeks, and months at a time.
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Q To maximize cost/effectiveness, it is possible that the space station
and the first manned planetary spacecraft will be developed from
common modules with the space station configuration serving as a
realistic training base for the later manned planetary mission.
When launch vehicle capabilities reach a point where a single booster
can place 500s000 pounds into orbit, the requirement for increasingly
larger chemical booster systems will taper off. From that point on
orbital payload requirements in excess of 500,000 pounds will probably
be met by multiple launchings and assembly in orbit.
0 In the post-1970 time period, if the planned evolution of rearmed
and unmanned spacecraft and launch vehicles takes place, and new
programs such as the large manned space station, the lunar base and
manned planetary exploration as well as an advanced MOL are initiated,
significant expansion and orders-of-magnitude improvements in the
existing earth-based operational and logistic support systems will
have to take place. In the post-1970-1980 time period the develop-
ment of large-seale operational support and logistics facfliUes in
space or on the lunar surface will take _. These new and unique
facilities could serve as supplementary launch, tracking, recovery
and re-entry stations; as space repair and rescue fact•ties; or as
"_s_ring areas for major plan,?tary and lunar operations. As such,
these space-based support facilities Would supplement some of the
tasks curren_y carried out at the present earth-based launching,
recovery and control centers.
Q The federal appropriations and expenditures for space technology are
a reflection of: 1) U.S. national policies and objectives; 2) the Soviet
teclmo-mflitary threat; and 3) specific military and/or scientifl0 re-
quirements. In addition to these factors, the national space budget
is molded by decisions and actions taken in Congress, the Executive
Branch, the government agencies, the scientific community and
private industry.
A decision to increase or decrease total federal space budgets, or
specific portions thereof, affects the planning, the direction, and
in some cases, the very survivability of specific space projects
and programs. For example, on May 25, 1961, when
152
D
$
O
O
O
President Kennedy established a national goal to place men on the
moon before 1970, the fiscaland legislativemachinery of the U.S.
government was set in motion, a supplemental appropriation of
$549 million was added to our space effort, and a re-examination
of NASA's man-in-space program was initiated. Subsequently, the
time schedules, budget priorities, and the management of such pro-
jects as Gemini, Apollo, and Saturn were significantlymodified.
Of the total amounts appropriated for space in the 1958 through 1966
time period, NASA's slmre increased from $117 million or 34 per
cent of the total federal space budget, to approximately $5.2 billion
or 74 per cent of the FSB. In the same time period, the DOD portion
of the federal space budget also increased from approximately $206
million to _1.7 billion. However, on a percentage-of-total basis, the
DOD space appropriations decreased during the 1958-1966 time period
from 60 to 24 per cent of the FSB.
Federal space budgets could remain at current levels through 1970
as a result of a continuation and possible further escalation of the
Vietnamese war, a factor that space-age managers in government
and industry will have to take into consideration in their planning
activities.
There are a number of developments which could take place between
1966 and 1970 which could result in an increase in the total annual
space budgets, above the current $7 billion level. For example, it
is very possible that a continuing series of Soviet space "spectaculars",
such as a manned cislunar flight, the construction of a space station
in earth orbit or a lunar landing (all of which are technologically
possible before 1970), could result in demands to step up and/or
supplement the current space programs and thus lead to further in-
creases in annual space appropriations above the Y_7billion level.
This would certainly occur ff Congress approved one or more of the
proposed post-Apollo programs, i.e., the lunar base, the manned
space station or manned planetary exploration.
On the basis of evolving and currently unforeseen program require-
ments, coupled with the effect of the Soviet space developments and/or
military threats, it is possible that the total federal space budget
coul._..__drise from the current _7 billion-plateau to as much as $13 million
by 1971. This budgetary increase is certain to occur if we get firm
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evidence that the _ussians are going to beat us to the moon and
have initiated a manned lV_ars exploration program.
In spite of some conflict and overlap, as illustrated by the MOL and
Apollo space station programs, it appears that NASA and the Depart-
ment of Defense will continue to view U.S. policies and objectives
through the same pair of glasses. This will be reflected in a
strengthening of the close working relationships between the two
agencies; their utilization of interagency planning and study groups--
such as the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, the
Gemini Joint Planning Board and the Joint Manned Space Flight
Committee--to resolve organizational, technical and budgetary con-
flicts; and their joint management of, or cooperation on, certain
projects, such as the X-15, Gemini, IV_OL and Apollo.
Following the precedent set by such programs as the X-15, Mercury
and Gemini, DOD and NASA will probably cooperate on the develop-
ment of the large manned space station as well as the hypersonic
research aircraft, a vehicle with the capability to take off from a
conventional airfield, go into orbit, re-enter and land like an aircraft.
Another project of major size and importance, which in all probability,
will be jointly managed by NASA and DOD, is the construction of a
lunar base.
Owing to the size and complexity of the lunar project, the resources
required, and the multimission capabilities inherent in a lunar base,
a closely coordinated management effort by D OD and NASA may be
required. Or, it may be necessary to establish a new and autonomous
Comsat type agency to manage the project.
The growing numbers of scientists and technicians going into the
aerospace industry is also one of the factors responsible for upsetting
the industry's traditional four-to-one ratio of production to non-
production workers. For example, in 1954, hourly production workers
comprised 72 per cent of the aerospace industry's work force. By
1959, only 50 per cent were production workers. At the present
time, aerospace production workers represent roughly 40 per cent
of the industry total, whereas predictions indicate it will decrease to
approximately 30 per cent by 1970.
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After World War II and the Korean War, nuclear weaponry, high
performance jet aircraft and ballistic missiles, as well as the "new
look" in military strategy changed, the character of the aircraft and
electronics industry. Large numbers of aircraft and missiles were
no longer required. Consequently, mass production facilities and
machine tools were not needed. Moreover, the aircraft, missile,
and electronics systems of the nuclear age were not only built in
fewer numbers, but were considerably more complex. This led to
a reduced demand for large numbers of production workers on one
hand, but an increased demand for skilled technicians, engineers, and
scientists on the other.
The problem of how to dispose of, or reduce, the excess production
facilities and machine tools inherited from World War II and the Korean
War period still plagues the federal government and the aerospace
industry. In some cases, the remedy has been modification, con-
solidation, or sale of excess facilities, or scrapping of obsolete tools
and equipment. This, along with the construction of new space age
facilities (in most eases away from the area of the home plant) has
created economic, social, and political problems near the home plant,
as well as in the area where the new facility is located.
One of the most significant factors affecting aerospace decision-making
and planning is the space accomplishments of the Soviet Union. For
example, their demonstrated ability to achieve space "firsts" (i.e.,
the first earth satellite, the first man in orbit, and the first to soft
land instruments on the moon) is not only a direct challenge to our
technical and managerial competence, but to our international prestige;
whereas, the military implications of their space program pose a
threat to our national security and defense posture.
The Soviet space program directly or indirectly influences: 1) national
policy, as formulated by the President, Congress, and the heads of
government agencies; 2) the amount and distribution of the annual
federal space budget; 3) the decisions made by aerospace management
in both government and industry; 4) the priority, scheduling and planning
of the various DOD and NASA programs; and 5) the direction and scope
of American technological developments.
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It would be an over-generalization to state that all changes in our space
program between 1957 and the present were no more _ reactions
to Soviet efforts; however, there is enough evidence to indicate that
Russian space accomplishments have and will continue to influence
the magnitude, direction, funding and organization of our space effort
as well as the related decision-making and planning.
While the Soviet Union will have a wide spectrum of space options to
choose from between now and 1970, the most significant Soviet space
development may not take place in earth orbital, cislunar or planetary
space, or even in the area of possible military applications, but in what
they accomplish on the moonVs surface. For example, before 1969,
the Soviet Union should have the man-rated boosters, the associated
technology, and the operational experience to land a manned spacecraft
on the moon. This mission has been cited by leading Soviet scientists,
cosmonauts and politicians as one of their priority goals. If they
carry out a lunar landing before 1969, the USSR could win the moon
race by at least one year, unless the pace of the Apollo program can
be increased significantly.
There are indications that the Soviet Union will employ earth orbit
rendezvous rather than a lunar orbit mode to land men on the moon.
In the earth orbit mode the Russians could utilize an improved version
of the Vostok or Voskhod spacecraft as building blocks with earth
orbit-to-moon propulsion and landing modules attached. To launch
the lunar spacecraft modules the new Proton booster with high energy
upper stages could be used. The development, by 1968-1969, of a
lunar lander based on Vostok, Voskhod or Proton, an advanced version
of the Proton booster, and multiple launching and orbital assembly
techniques are we'll within the estimated technological capabilities of
the Soviet Union.
It should be emphasized that any of the current and future Soviet space
developments could evolve into military systems when and if a re-
quirement arises. This is to be expected inasmuch as the USSR has
never differentiated between scientific and military research and
development, and Soviet leaders by their past actions and statements
have frequently stressed the military significance of their technological
achievements.
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Of all the possible future Soviet space activities, the one which would
have the greatest effect on the composition and evolution of the U.S.
space program is the development of a military space capability by
the USSR: particularly ff it is an offensive weapon. There is
no question that the USSR has the basic building Mocks for developing
military space systems and will deploy them, if the need arises.
When their systems will be deployed and what specific form they will
take is difficult to predict.
T_e series of technological achievetnents, beginning with Sputnik I,
as well as the close ties that exist between Russia's scientific and
military community, gives positive evidence of a well-planned space
program with a dual objective in mind: 1) to establish the scientific
primacy of the USSR; and 2) to develop a technical and military
capability to control the realm of space.
While the aerospace industry is highly competitive, it is not
competitive in the same sense that General Motors and the Ford
Motor Company are competitive. These differences are mainly a
function of the aerospace industry's unique characteristics and
position in the American economy. For example, the aerospace
industry, unlike the more traditional commercial companies, designs
and produces hardware primarily for national defense and space
exploration. Consequently, With the federal government as its
principal customer, the industry is at one and the same time a
private industrial concern and a prime instrument of national policy.
Since the aerospace industry employs one-fifth of the nation's
scientists and engineers it has developed a unique capability to solve
the most complex technological problems. However, because it has
this problem-solving capability, the aerospace industry has had to
function with an extraordinary degree of flexibility, take greater
than normal risks, and reach out beyond the leading edge of techno-
logy to a greater extent than consumer-oriented industries. More-
over, the aerospace industry has had to adjust rapidly to quantum
changes in a variety of directions in order to survive, particularly,
as the pace of technology has accelerated, as the military and
technological capabilities of the Soviet Union have increased, and as
national policies have changed to meet these challenges.
Both NASA and DOD encourage the aerospace industry to be competi-
tive in a number of ways; one being the use of the incentive contract
and the other through the mechanics of the source-selection board.
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_E CO_¢i_ENDA TIONS
Based upon the research conducted during the preparation of this report
it is recommended that the following topics be considered for further study:
O The space policy implications of a pre-196_ Soviet manned lunar
landing. A post-1969 Soviet manned lunar landing.
0 Cost/effectiveness criteria for selecting post-Apollo goals.
O Policy alternatives relative to U.S.-Soviet cooperation and/or
conflict in space.
0 The application of aerospace planning and decision-making techniques
to other regional and national problems.
O Major space technology trends for 1970-1985.
0 The impact of a Soviet military breakthrough in space.
O The role of private industry in space policy formulation.
O The policy implications of a joint U. S.-Soviet lunar base program
and/or joint U.S. -Soviet iViars expedition.
0 Possible Soviet space goals for 1970-1980.
0 The application of space systems management techniques to the
development of urban transportation systems.
0 Similarities and differences between military and civil space
missions, operational requirements and technology.
0 The application of space management techniques and technology
to oceanographic research.
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The impact of the war in Vietnam on space program planning
and decision-making.
The national requirements for, and utility of, a hypersonic
aerospace vehicle.
Technical and operational alternatives to large-payload, post-
Saturn booster systems.
The impact of the new planning-programming and budgeting system
on the federal decision-making process.
The economic and social impact of an expanded space program.
The impact of a reduced or minimum effort space program.
Competitive practices in the aerospace industry: Selected case
histories.
The manned space station and the manned Mars spacecraft: A
composite system or two separate systems.
Space policy formulation: Its process, evolution and structure.
The growth potential of the M OL Program.
A comparative analysis of U.S. space goals and other national
objectives.
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